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Neuroscience is one of the fastest growing scientific fields in terms
of the numbers of scientists and the knowledge being gained.1 In recent
years, both the scope of neuroscience and the methodologies employed
by neuroscientists have broadly expanded, from biochemical and genetic
analysis of individual nerve cells and their molecular constituents, to the
imaging of brain structure and function.2 Perhaps the most significant
recent neuroscientific achievement is the ability of neuroimaging
technologies, including functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
to image brain function.3 Clinicians and scientists use fMRI not only to
map sensory, motor, and cognitive function, but also to study the neural
* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Health Law and PolicyCenter, Drake University Law
School, Des Moines, Iowa. I thank Austin Sarat, Martha Umphrey, John Servos, Lawrence
Douglas, Jan Dizard, Anthony Bishop, and Steve George at Amherst College for inviting me to write
this Article as part of the “NeuroLaw: What Neuroscience Offersto Law” conference, sponsored by
the Amherst College President’s Initiative Fund. I also thank the participants of the NeuroLaw
conference, including Hank Greely, Stephen Morse, Owen Jones, and Joshua Greene, for their
helpful comments.
1. JONATHAN D. MORENO, MIND WARS: BRAIN RESEARCH AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 3
(2006).
2. Id. at 17. See also Peter Woodruff, Imaging the Brain: Clinical and Research
Implications for Neuropsychiatry, in BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY AND HUMANITY: THE IMPACT OF
TECHNOLOGY ON HEALTH CARE ETHICS 147-50 (Chris Gastmans ed., 2002).
3. WALTER GLANNON, BIOETHICS AND THE BRAIN 45 (2007).
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correlates of a range of physical and mental conditions, behaviors,
characteristics, and preferences.4 Due to its recent move outside the
clinical and research contexts, fMRI raises a number of ethical, legal,
and social issues that are being examined within the overlapping fields
of neuroethics5 and neurolaw.6
In March 2007, New York Times journalist Jeffrey Rosen identified
a number of legal issues raised by advances in neuroscience under the
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.7 Scholars are examining these and other issues as part of a
burgeoning neurolaw literature that focuses heavily on criminal law,8
4. See Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging Information: A Case for Neuro
Exceptionalism? 47 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 423-41 (2007).
5. See, e.g., JUDY ILLES, NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND
POLICY ix (2006); STEVEN J. MARCUS, NEUROETHICS: MAPPING THE FIELD (2004).
6. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 11, 2007 (stating
that “[t]he extent of that revolution is hotly debated, but the influence of what some called neurolaw
is clearly growing.”); SEMIR ZEKI & OLIVER GOODENOUGH, LAW & THE BRAIN vi (2006); BRENT
GARLAND, NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE vii-viii
(2004) (noting that neurolaw also has been used to refer to the area of personal injury trial practice
dealing with traumatic brain injuries and spinal cord injuries.). See, e.g., J. SHERROD TAYLOR,
NEUROLAW: BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD INJURIES § 1:04 (1997).
7. Rosen, supra note 6.
8. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 5 PLOS BIOLOGY 693
(2007); O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1265 (2007); O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging, Entrapment, and the Predisposition to Crime,
7(9) AM. J. BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 60 (2007); Jay D. Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and
the Juvenile Death Penalty, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 115 (2007); Melissa S. Caulum,
Postadolescent Brain Development: A Disconnect Between Neuroscience, Emerging Adults, and the
Corrections System, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 729 (2007); Abram S. Barth, A Double-Edged Sword: The
Role of Neuroimaging in Federal Capital Sentencing, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 501 (2007); Debra
Niehoff, Invisible Scars: The Neurobiological Consequences of Child Abuse, 56 DEPAUL L. REV.
847 (2007); Owen D. Jones, Law, Evolution, and the Brain: Applications and Open Questions, in
LAW & THE BRAIN 57 (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006); Joshua Greene and Jonathan
Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, in LAW & THE BRAIN, 207
(Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006); Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and
Behavioral Biology, 105(2) COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005); Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim
Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3(2) OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006);
Stephen J. Morse, Moral and Legal Responsibility and the New Neuroscience, in NEUROETHICS:
DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 33 (Judy Illes ed., 2006); Oliver R.
Goodenough, Responsibility and Punishment: Whose Mind? A Response, in LAW & THE BRAIN 259
(Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006); Eileen P. Ryan & Sarah B. Berson, Mental Illness
and the Death Penalty, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 351 (2006); Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal
Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, in LAW & THE BRAIN 227 (Semir Zeki & Oliver
Goodenough eds., 2006); Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and
Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51 (2006); James H. Fallon,
Neuroanatomical Background to Understanding the Brain of the Young Psychopath, 3 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 341 (2006); Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and the Law: A
Role in Juvenile Justice? 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321 (2006); Katherine H. Federle, The Mind of a
Child: The Relationship between Brain Development, Cognitive Functioning, and Accountability

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss2/5

2

Tovino: Neuroscience and Health Law

10-TOVINO_PUB_EDITS.DOC

2009]

4/14/2009 1:20 PM

NEUROSCIENCE AND HEALTH LAW

471

criminal procedure,9 and evidence law,10 as well as tort law,11 property
law,12 intellectual property,13 confidentiality and privacy,14 protection of
human subjects,15 the regulation of neuroscience-based technologies,
under the Law, 3(2) OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 317 (2006); Jessie A. Seiden, The Criminal Brain: Frontal
Lobe Dysfunction in Capital Proceedings, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 395 (2004); Lucy C. Ferguson, The
Implications of Developmental Cognitive Research on “Evolving Standards of Decency” and the
Imposition of the Death Penalty on Juveniles, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 441 (2004); Laura Reider, Toward
a New Test for the Insanity Defense: Incorporating the Discoveries of Neuroscience into Moral and
Legal Theories, 46 UCLA L. REV. 289 (1998).
9. See, e.g., Sean Kevin Thompson, A Brave New World of Interrogation Jurisprudence?, 33
AM. J.L. & MED. 341 (2007); Sarah E. Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe, Emerging Neurotechnologies for
Lie Detection and the Fifth Amendment, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 359 (2007); Michael S. Pardo,
Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301 (2006);
Erich Taylor, A New Wave of Police Interrogation? “Brain Fingerprinting,” The Constitutional
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, and Hearsay Jurisprudence, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y
287 (2006); Sean Kevin Thompson, The Legality of the Use of Psychiatric Neuroimaging in
Intelligence Interrogation, 90(6) CORNELL L. REV. 1601 (2005); Richard G. Boire, Searching the
Brain: The Fourth Amendment Implications of Brain-Based Deception Devices, 5(2) AM. J.
BIOETHICS 62 (2005).
10. See, e.g., Mark Pettit, Jr., FMRI and BF Meet FRE: Brain Imaging and the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 319 (2007); Leo Kittay, Admissibility of fMRI Lie Detection: The
Cultural Bias against “Mind Reading” Devices, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1351 (2007); Erin A. Egan,
Neuroimaging as Evidence, 7(9) AM. J. BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 62 (2007); Jocelyn Downie &
Ronalda Murphy, Inadmissible, Eh?, 7(9) AM. J. BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 67 (2007); Charles
N.W. Keckler, Cross-Examining the Brain: A Legal Analysis of Neural Imaging for Credibility
Impeachment, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 509 (2006); Archie Alexander, Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging Lie Detection: Is a “Brainstorm” Heading Toward the Gatekeeper? 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 1 (2006).
11. See, e.g., Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience, Emotional Harm, and Emotional Distress Tort
Claims, 7(9) AM. J. BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 65 (2007); Adrian M. Viens, The Use of Functional
Neuroimaging Technology in the Assessment of Loss and Damages in Tort Law, 7(9) AM. J.
BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 63 (2007); Adam Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective
Experience, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 433 (2007).
12. See, e.g., Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Property ‘Instinct,’ in LAW & THE BRAIN 185 (Semir
Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006).
13. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and Property: Some Possible
Legal and Social Implications of Advances in Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW:
BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 114 (Brent Garland ed., 2004).
14. See, e.g., Tovino, supra note 4, at 416; Henry T. Greely, The Social Effects of Advances in
Neuroscience: Legal Problems, Legal Perspectives, in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN
THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 245 (Judy Illes ed., 2006); Stacey A. Tovino, The Visible Brain:
Confidentiality and Privacy Implications of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (2006)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas) (on file with author); Stacey A. Tovino, The
Confidentiality and Privacy Implications of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33(4) J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 844 (2005); Committee on Science and Law, Are Your Thoughts Your Own?
“Neuroprivacy” and the Legal Implications of Brain Imaging, 60 CBA RECORD 407 (2005);
Greely, supra note 13, at 114.
15. See, e.g., Jennifer Kulynych, Some Thoughts about the Evaluation of Non-Clinical
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 7(9) AM. J. BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 57 (2007);
Jennifer Kulynych, The Regulation of MR Neuroimaging Research: Disentangling the Gordian
Knot, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 295 (2007); Jennifer Kulynych, Legal and Ethical Issues in
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especially fMRI-based lie detectors,16 and even practical advice for
lawyers and judges regarding the assessment of neuroscience-based legal
claims and the evaluation of the training, credentials, and courtroom
credibility of neurospsychological experts.17
Little attention has been paid, however, to the implications of
advances in neuroscience for more traditional civil and regulatory health
law issues. I thus explore the ways in which neuroscience impacts a
range of health, disability, and benefit law issues, including the scope of
public and private health insurance benefits (Part II), the mental health
parity debate (Part III), protected status under federal and state disability
law (Part IV), and the distribution of benefits under social security and
other benefit programs (Part V). I find that patients, patient advocacy
organizations, litigants, lobbyists, legislatures, and scholars are relying
on advances in neuroscience to characterize traditionally suspect mental
health conditions as brain-based conditions worthy of insurance
coverage, protected civil status, and disability and other benefits.
Although stakeholders, by and large, are not making completely
unfounded or speculative claims about neuroscience, what does give me
cause for pause is the appropriateness of the subsequent normative
argument; that is, that all mental disorders should be treated as covered
or protected conditions for purposes of health, disability, and benefit
law. I conclude that advances in neuroscience give us reason to revisit
age-old health, disability, and benefit law questions (such as, “Which
kinds of mental suffering create a legitimate claim for assistance from
others through [public or private] health insurance?”),18 but that
neuroscience does not yet answer these questions. Because I anticipate
that neuroscience will continue to play a role in the development and
shaping of health, disability, and benefit law and policy, I recommend
that lawyers and scholars who work in these areas (and not just those
who self-identify as neuroethicists or neurolawyers) be mindful of the

Neuroimaging Research: Human Subjects Protection, Medical Privacy, and the Public
Communication of Research Results, 50(3) BRAIN & COGNITION 345 (2002).
16. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent
Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. AND MED. 377 (2007); Henry T. Greely, Premarket Approval
Regulation for Lie Detection: An Idea Whose Time May Be Coming, 5(2) AM. J. BIOETHICS 50
(2005).
17. See, e.g., Daniel R. Orme & George Johnstone, Clinical Neuropsychologists: Training,
Credentials and Courtroom Credibility, 59 J. MO. B. 184 (2003); R.K. McKinzey, A Judge’s
Introduction to Neuropsychological Assessments, 37 COURT REV. 24 (2001).
18. James E. Sabin & Norman Daniels, Determining “Medical Necessity” in Mental Health
Practice, 24(6) HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5, 5 (1994).
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ways in which stakeholders will use neuroscience to bear on the
formulation and interpretation of such law.19
A few caveats and prefatory notes are in order. First, the field of
health law is extraordinarily broad and rapidly changing.20 In this
Article, I select just a few examples that I think are illustrative, although
not exhaustive, of the ways in which stakeholders currently are using
neuroscience to impact health law and policy. I hope that readers with
background in health law and policy will identify additional, relevant
settings in which neuroscience-based arguments may be raised and will
question whether such arguments should work in these settings.
Second, I will not be examining the desirability of the health,
disability, and benefit legal structures referenced in this Article. The
question I am trying to examine is, assuming their continued existence,
how might neuroscience impact their application?
Third, my approach in other neuroethics and neurolaw articles has
been one of caution, and this Article is no different. I have been careful
elsewhere and am careful here not to speculate about the potential of
neuroscience.
For reasons discussed herein, I anticipate that
stakeholders will continue to incorporate neuroscience-based arguments
into legal discussions, so I do think that lawyers and policymakers need
to be able to assess the traps, pitfalls, and potential merit of such
arguments, and recognize the evidentiary, substantive, and normative
responses that are available.
Finally, I think it is helpful to state at the outset the impetus for this
Article. In addition to teaching an introductory health law course that
focuses on health care quality, access, finance, and organization, I teach
a range of upper-level courses focused on civil and regulatory health law
issues. These include Mental Health Law, Elder Law, Law and
Bioethics, Complementary and Alternative Medicine and the Law,
Patients’ Rights, Comparative Health Law, and HIPAA Privacy. During
19. See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 3, 10 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J.
Winick eds., 1991) (encouraging stakeholders to consider ways in which the clinical literature might
bear on the formulation of legal arrangements).
20. Health law has been described as both an exciting and interdisciplinary field as well as an
incoherent discipline. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Some Thoughts on Academic Health Law, 41(2)
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391, 392 (2006) (stating that “the practice of health law is a huge, growing,
and vibrant activity.”); Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law? 41(2)
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 365, 365 (2006) (describing health law as incoherent and disjointed); Mark
A. Hall, The History and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist View, 41(2) WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 347, 353-54 (2006) (describing the evolution of health law into a coherent sub-discipline of
the law); Mark A. Hall et al., Rethinking Health Law, 41(2) WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 347-48
(2006).
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class preparation and discussion, I am surprised by the frequency with
which I am confronted with neuroscience-based stories and related
policy suggestions. During my fall 2006 Mental Health Law class, for
example, a thirty-five-year-old guest lecturer who has bipolar disorder
and is dually eligible (i.e., she receives social security disability benefits
from the Medicare Program as well as assistance with out-of-pocket
medical expenses from the Minnesota Medical Assistance program)
explained how she enjoyed participating in a free University of
Minnesota neuroimaging study, the purpose of which was to study the
efficacy of a drug for bipolar disorder that is covered neither by
Medicare nor Medicaid. Because my guest lecturer believes that the
experimental drug assisted her in resuming many activities of daily
living and enabled her to begin part-time volunteer work at a local
mental health facility, which she tremendously enjoys, she believes
Medicare and Medicaid should cover the drug. In another Mental Health
Law class, devoted to the topic of the civil commitment of pedophiles
and other sexually dangerous persons in the State of Minnesota, a guest
lecturer referenced recent investigations into the brains of pedophiles to
suggest a scheme for the release or permanent commitment, as
appropriate, of past pedophiles based on the results of a multidisciplinary team’s traditional psychiatric and (neuroimaging-based)
neurological evaluation. In my spring 2008 Complementary and
Alternative Medicine and the Law seminar, one student who was
questioning the efficacy of a range of alternative medicines and their
reimbursement by health insurers piqued the interest of another student,
who had recently read a review article examining the correlation
between specific acupuncture points and specific areas of brain
activation and deactivation, as measured by fMRI and positron emission
tomography.21 In this Article, I hope to show how stakeholders are
using advances in neuroscience to make similar, although more formal,
legal arguments and to lay the groundwork for analyzing these claims.
I. MENTAL DISORDER STATISTICS
Much of this Article involves the civil and administrative treatment
of individuals with mental disorders. “Mental disorders are common in
the United States” and abroad.22 According to the National Institute of

21. George T. Lewith et al., Investigating Acupuncture Using Brain Imaging Techniques: The
Current State of Play, 2(3) ECAM 315, 315 (2005) (stating that “[f]or example, points associated
with hearing and vision stimulate the visual and auditory cerebral areas respectively.”).
22. National Institute of Mental Health, Statistics, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health
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Mental Health (NIMH), an estimated 26.2% of American adults (or 57.5
million) suffer from a diagnosable mental disorder in a given year.23
Approximately 6% of American adults (or one in seventeen) suffer from
a serious mental illness.24 And, an estimated 45% of American adults
who have one diagnosable mental disorder meet criteria for at least one
more diagnosable mental disorder.25
Historically, individuals with mental disorders were treated with
contempt, fear, and cruelty, perhaps due to the belief that mental
disorders stemmed from parental misdeeds, demonic possession, or
deficient character.26 Mental illness remains poorly understood today.27
The National Mental Health Association, recently renamed Mental
Health America (MHA), estimates that 71% of Americans still believe
that mental illness is caused by mental weakness, 65% believe that
mental illness is the product of poor parenting, and 35% believe that
mental illness is a form of retribution for sinful or immoral behavior.28
Many patients, patient advocacy organizations, litigants, lobbyists,
legislators, and scholars believe that the stigma against mental disorders
plays a role in their lack of funding for research, their lack of parity in
public and private health insurance coverage, and their lack of available
and reimbursable treatments.29 Four sets of mental disorders, including
/statistics/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 29, 2008).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Keith Nelson, Legislative and Judicial Solutions for Mental Health Parity: S.
543, Reasonable Accommodation, and an Individualized Remedy under Title I of the ADA, 51 AM.
U. L. REV. 91, 97 (2001); Brian K. LaFratta, The Mental Health Parity Act: A Bar to Insurance
Benefits for the Elderly? 8 ELDER L.J. 393, 406 (2000) (stating that “until recently, the public
viewed mental illness as a curse or an affliction that one brought upon him or herself.”).
27. See, e.g., Jeffery Fraser, Allegheny County Mental Health Court Project, Executive
Summary
2
(Sept.
4,
2004),
http://199.224.17.100/uploadedFiles/DHS/Individual_
and_Community_Health/Mental_Health_Services_and_Support/Forensic_Services/MHCourtExecut
iveSummary.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2008).
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Pamela Signorello, The Failure of the ADA-Achieving Parity with Respect to
Mental and Physical Health Care Coverage in the Private Employment Realm, 10 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 349, 368 (2001) (stating that “[s]ome diseases are more politically ‘in’ than others. We
all know the more political backing there is, the more attention, the more funds, and the more
patient-protection legislation. My guess is that if AIDS rates a 10, then breast cancer is a 7, prostate
cancer is a 6 . . . . Yes, you guessed it. I am unable to assign a number to the mental health
category. If I have to judge by the coverage in the popular press, the category is close the bottom of
the food chain.”); id. at 368, 371 (stating that “[c]ontrary to lingering public perception, mental
illnesses are not indicative of personal weakness, lack of character, or poor upbringing . . . . One
thing is certain. The stigma associated with mental illness has supported the disparity in health care
coverage.”); Nicole Martinson, Inequality between Disabilities: The Different Treatment of Mental
Versus Physical Disabilities in Long-Term Disability Benefit Plans, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 361, 361
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schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, drug and alcohol dependence, and
anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa, are frequently used to illustrate
these claims. A brief summary of the neuroscientific investigation of
these four sets of disorders is set forth at Appendix A to this Article. A
careful review of these studies reveals many findings as well as many
discrepancies and contradictions.30 Some of these studies do find that
the brains of individuals affected by these conditions are
neuroanatomically, neurocognitively, and/or neurochemically “different”
when compared to the brains of healthy controls.31 In the past twenty
years, stakeholders have referenced these findings in an attempt to
influence health law and policy, especially the scope of private and
public health insurance benefits.
II. THE SCOPE OF HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS
Most adult Americans with private health insurance coverage
receive coverage through their employers as a benefit of employment.32
When employers first began offering health insurance benefits,33 covered
employees generally had access to physical and mental health benefits
under the same terms and conditions.34 Beginning in the 1970s, many

(1998) (stating that “[t]he stigma of mental illness has kept many in need from seeking help, and it
has prevented policymakers from providing it.”); Brian D. Shannon, Paving the Path to Parity in
Health Insurance Coverage for Mental Illness: New Law or Merely Good Intentions?, 68 U. COLO.
L. REV. 63, 85 (1997) (citing 142 Cong. Rec. S3590 (Daily ed. Apr.18, 1996) (statement of Senator
Wellstone)) (stating that “[t]he stigma of mental illness has kept many in need from seeking help,
and it has prevented policymakers from providing it. And for too long, persons in need of mental
health services who reach private coverage discriminatory limits have been dumped onto
Government-funded programs.”).
30. See, e.g., Russell T. Loeber et al., Differences in Cerebellar Blood Volume in
Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder, 37 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 81, 81 (1999) (reporting findings and
contradictions in brain studies of individuals with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder).
31. See, e.g., Richard E. Gardner, Mind Over Matter? The Historical Search for Meaningful
Parity Between Mental and Physical Health Care Coverage, 49 EMORY L.J. 675, 683 (2000)
(quoting Fuller Torrey, one of America’s most famous psychiatrists: “[T]he ‘evidence is now
overwhelming that the brains of persons who have schizophrenia are, as a group, different from
brains of persons who do not have the disease.’”); Karen Faith Berman, Functional Neuroimaging
in Schizophrenia, in NEUROSPYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: THE FIFTH GENERATION OF PROGRESS 745,
747 (Kenneth L. Davis et al. eds., 2002); Philip McGuire et al., Functional Neuroimaging in
Schizophrenia: Diagnosis and Drug Discovery, 29(2) TRENDS IN PHARMACOLOGICAL SCI. 91, 96
(2008) .
32. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 26, at 92.
33. See, e.g., PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE
RISE OF A SOVEREIGN PROFESSION AND THE MAKING OF A VAST INDUSTRY 294-95 (1949)
(discussing early examples of employer-based health insurance).
34. Dana L. Kaplan, Can Legislation Alone Solve America’s Mental Health Dilemma?
Current State Legislative Schemes Cannot Achieve Mental Health Parity, 8 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
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employers reduced their mental health benefits, which were thought to
be more expensive than physical health benefits.35 The Jackson Hole
Group, an influential body of health care executives and policy analysts,
even recommended that employers limit their mental health benefits to
twenty outpatient visits and thirty inpatient days each year.36 Some
employers also increased deductibles and lowered lifetime and daily
limits applicable to mental health care.37
These benefit package changes resulted in a disparity between the
private insurance coverage that was provided for employees’ physical
illnesses and mental disorders.38 Health insurance plans that covered
365 days of inpatient care for physical illnesses might cover only 45
days of inpatient care for mental disorders.39 Plans that provided
unlimited outpatient visits for treatment of physical illnesses might allow
only twenty outpatient visits for treatment of mental disorders.40 And
plans that contained a $1 million lifetime cap for treatment of physical
illnesses might contain only a $50,000 lifetime cap for treatment of
mental disorders.41 These coverage disparities adversely affected
individuals with both “traditional” and “suspect” mental health
conditions.42 Many individuals with disabling bipolar disorder and
severe anorexia nervosa, for example, were forced to discontinue their
inpatient and outpatient treatments when they had reached their mental
health benefit caps.43 The lack of treatment exacerbated underlying
illnesses and symptoms, sometimes leading to unemployment,
homelessness, incarceration, and premature death.44
325, 328 (2005).
35. See, e.g., Allan Beigel & Steven S. Sharfstein, Mental Health Care Providers: Not the
Only Cause or Only Cure for Rising Costs, 142(5) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 668, 668 (May 1984)
(stating that “[i]n 1955 mental health expenditures were estimated to be $1.2 billion, or 6% of all
expenditures. By 1977 the total amount of expenditures for mental health care had risen to $19.6
billion, 12% of all expenditures. Even with a correction for population growth and price increases,
this amounts to a fourfold increase in mental health expenditures.”); Kaplan, supra note 34, at 328
(stating that mental health benefits are two to three times as expensive as physical illness benefits).
36. See Robert Pear, White House Plan Would Cover Costs of Mental Illness, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 1993, at A1.
37. See, e.g., Beigel & Sharfstein, supra note 35, at 668 (stating that “[c]osts have risen,
resulting in resistance to financing treatment of mental illness in both public and private sectors.”);
Kaplan, supra note 34, at 328.
38. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 34, at 328.
39. See Shannon, supra note 29, at 68.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See, e.g., Beth A. Brunalli, Anorexia Killed Her, but the System Failed Her: Does the
American Insurance System Suffer from Anorexia?, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 583, 591, 597-98 (2006).
44. See, e.g., John V. Jacobi, Parity and Difference: The Value of Parity Legislation for the
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In the late 1980s and early 1990s, some patients who were denied
additional mental health benefits sued their insurers, arguing that their
conditions were physical rather than mental in nature and thus covered
under the “better” set of benefits.45 In these contract-based lawsuits, the
plaintiffs’ experts routinely referenced advances in the behavioral and
brain sciences to support their testimony. In a 1987 case out of
Arkansas, for example, an insured father sued Blue Cross Blue Shield
(BCBS) when it denied additional benefits to his dependent daughter,
who had a diagnosis of bipolar affective disorder.46 The BCBS plan at
issue in Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc. v. Doe provided
liberal benefits for hospitalization and medical treatment for physical
illnesses and accidental injuries, but only limited benefits for “mental,
psychiatric, and nervous conditions,” which the plan did not define.47 At
trial, the father called three psychiatrists and two clinical psychologists
to testify that bipolar disorder is a physical disease of the brain.48 The
experts referenced advances in “medical research” to support their
testimony that bipolar affective disorder is an illness of the brain that
stems from physical and biological causes.49 The court ultimately
agreed that the daughter’s illness was a physical condition within the
meaning of the BCBS plan,50 but the victory was short-lived.51
Following the Doe decision, BCBS re-wrote its Arkansas policy and
clarified that the coverage limitation for psychiatric conditions applied
whether the condition was “‘organic or non-organic, whether of
biological, non-biological, chemical or non-chemical origin, and
irrespective of cause, basis or inducement.’”52
Two years later, in 1989, a New York appellate court came to a
similar result by focusing instead on the nature of the medical treatment
provided to the patient.53 In Simons v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Greater

Seriously Mentally Ill, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 185, 185 (2003); Nelson, supra note 26, at 99.
45. See, e.g., Brunalli, supra note 43, at 598.
46. Ark. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc. v. Doe, 733 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987).
47. Id. at 430.
48. Id. at 431.
49. Id. at 431 (stating that “Dr. Thomas Harris, a treating psychiatrist . . . stated it is in fact a
physical disorder. ‘The medical research is now, in my opinion, overwhelming in that regard.’ He
stated that it was an illness of the brain and body rather than of the mind and stemmed from a
chemical imbalance which responds to medication. This illness, like many others he described,
manifests some behavioral or emotional disturbances, but the causes of those manifestations are
physical and biological in nature as distinguished from mental.”).
50. Id. at 432.
51. Shannon, supra note 29, at 76.
52. Id.
53. Simons v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 536 N.Y.S.2d 431, 431-32 (N.Y.
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New York, an insured father sued BCBS after it denied coverage for
additional inpatient days for his dependent teenage daughter, Amy, who
had anorexia nervosa.54 The BCBS plan at issue covered 120 days each
year of inpatient hospitalization for “appropriate medical treatment,” but
only thirty days of inpatient hospitalization for “psychiatric disorders.”55
At trial, several pediatricians testified that the additional inpatient
treatments Amy received, including nasogastric feedings and
intravenous fluids, were necessary because of her physical condition,
which was extremely emaciated, malnourished, dehydrated, and
hypotensive.56 The court agreed and ruled that Amy’s inpatient
hospitalization was covered because it involved medical, not psychiatric,
treatment.57 Other courts faced with similar claims also have focused on
the nature of the treatment provided. In cases in which the treatment
involved
psychotherapy,
psychotropic
medications,
and
electroconvulsive therapy, the courts tend to rule in favor of the
insurer.58
Some courts focus not on the origin of the plaintiff’s condition or
the nature of the treatments provided but, instead, on the ways in which
the plaintiff’s condition manifests itself. In Equitable Life Insurance
Society v. Berry, a plaintiff, who became totally disabled as a result of
his bipolar disorder, sued his insurance company for both long-term
disability benefits and medical benefits.59 The long-term disability plan
expressly excluded coverage for “mental and nervous disorders.”60 The
App. Div. 1989).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 432.
56. Id. at 433.
57. Id. at 434 (stating that “[t]he plain, ordinary meaning of ‘psychiatric’ care is the sort of
treatment, such as electroshock therapy and psychotropic medication, rendered to a patient who has
been admitted to a psychiatric ward in order to attend to his or her psychiatric disorder. Amy was
hospitalized because of malnutrition and hypotension, not depression or some other psychological
malady, and, in that respect, she was provided with the medical treatment necessary to alleviate her
particular physical problems. The fact that Amy’s physical disability was the result of the
psychiatric condition known as anorexia nervosa does not transform what is customarily medical
treatment into psychiatric treatment; malnutrition and hypotension necessitate the same medical care
regardless of whether the condition is attributable to anorexia nervosa, some organic source or
simply the financial inability to procure food. It is the physical condition, and the treatment
required to deal with that condition, which is crucial, not the reason for the disorder.”).
58. See, e.g., Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1525, 1530 (11th Cir. 1990)
(treating the insured’s postpartum depression as a mental illness because the insured received
individual psychotherapy, psychoactive drug therapy, electroconvulsive therapy, and participated in
group counseling sessions).
59. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Berry, 212 Cal. App. 3d 832, 834-35 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989).
60. Id. at 835.
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medical plan stated that it would pay only 50% of physician charges for
“mental and/or nervous treatment,” which the plan defined as “treatment
for a neurosis, psycho-neurosis, psychopathy, psychosis, or mental or
nervous disease or disorder of any kind.”61 At trial, the plaintiff called
an expert witness who testified that the plaintiff’s disorder was an
organic disease caused by a chemical imbalance and other physiological
disease processes.62 The court, taking judicial notice of the then-current
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM), which listed bipolar disorder as a mental disorder,63 disagreed,
stating that the test was whether the manifestation, not the origin, of the
disorder was mental or physical in nature.64 Because the plaintiff’s
disorder manifested itself in very high moods and very low moods, the
court classified his disorder as a mental disorder.65
In 1990, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also focused on
symptoms, reasoning that most laypersons understand illnesses in terms
of their symptoms, not their origin. In Brewer v. Lincoln National Life
Insurance Company, an insured father sued Lincoln National Life
Insurance Company when it denied additional benefits to his dependent
son, who had an affective mood disorder that manifested itself in a sharp
decline in grades, repeated incidents of lying, mood swings, and aberrant
behavior in and out of school.66 One of the applicable insurance plans
limited coverage for hospital charges associated with “‘mental
illness(es), functional nervous disorder(s) . . . or for psychiatric or
psychoanalytic care.’”67 A second applicable plan limited coverage for
the care of “‘mental illness(es).’”68 Neither plan defined mental
illness.69 At trial, the father called three physicians of various specialties
to testify that “mounting medical evidence suggest[s] that affective
mood disorder is genetically or biologically caused.”70 Notwithstanding,

61. Id.
62. Id. at 839-40.
63. Id. at 840.
64. Id. (stating that “[e]very reasonable layman would view a person manifesting such
derangement as suffering from a mental disease. The policies here in question exclude all mental
disease from coverage . . . regardless of whether the disability was caused by a chemical imbalance,
a blow on the head, being frightened by a black cat, inability to cope or whatever . . . . In the
disability policy, mental disorders are expressly ‘not covered’. Period . . . . Manifestation, not
cause, is the yardstick.”).
65. Id. at 839-40.
66. Brewer v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 150, 152, 154 (8th Cir. 1990).
67. Id. at 152.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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the Eighth Circuit found that the son’s affective mood disorder was a
mental illness subject to the more limited coverage because symptoms,
not origin, mattered, and because most laypersons would agree that the
symptoms of affective mood disorder are behavioral, rather than
physical, in nature.71 Other courts also have followed the layperson
approach en route to ruling in favor of the insurer.72
In a 1992 case, the Seventh Circuit blamed the insurer for failing to
adequately define “mental illness” in its contractual provisions that
provided lower lifetime benefits, lower annual benefits, and lower daily
benefits for mental illnesses.73 In Phillips v. Lincoln National Life
Insurance Company, an insured father sued Lincoln National, the same
defendant in the previous case, when Lincoln National denied additional
benefits to the father’s dependent son, James, who had a diagnosis of
congenital encephalopathy that gave rise to a range of behavioral
problems.74 To prove that James’ condition was a physical illness,
subject to the better benefit package, the father submitted evidence of a
brain scan that revealed a portion of James’ brain that was “‘not putting
out the electrical impulses or processing electrical stimuli and impulses
the way it would normally.’”75 The Seventh Circuit ultimately affirmed
the district court’s decision to construe the “mental illness” provision
against the insurer because the provision did not define mental illness.76

71. Id. at 154 (stating that “[t]he cause of a disease is a judgment for experts, while laymen
know and understand symptoms. Laymen undoubtedly are aware that some mental illnesses are
organically caused while others are not; however, they do not classify illnesses based on their
origins. Instead, laypersons are inclined to focus on the symptoms of an illness; illnesses whose
primary symptoms are depression, mood swings and unusual behavior are commonly characterized
as mental illnesses regardless of their cause . . . . [The son’s] disease manifested itself in terms of
mood swings and aberrant behavior. Regardless of the cause of his disorder, it is abundantly clear
that he suffered from what laypersons would consider to be a ‘mental illness.’”).
72. See, e.g., Tolson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 604, 609-10 (5th Cir. 1998)
(following the layperson approach in concluding that depression is a mental illness); Lynd v.
Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 979, 983-84 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that “[l]aypersons are
inclined to focus on the symptoms of an illness; illnesses whose primary symptoms are depression,
mood swings and unusual behavior are commonly characterized as mental illness regardless of their
cause.”); Pelletier v. Fleet Fin. Group, 2000 WL 1513711, at *5 and n. 7 (D.N.H. Sept. 19, 2000)
(following the layperson approach in concluding that a major depressive disorder is a mental
illness); Attar v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 1997 WL 446439, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 19, 1997) (following
the layperson approach in concluding that bipolar disorder is a mental illness).
73. Phillips v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 310, 314 (7th Cir. 1992).
74. Id. at 304.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 314 (stating that “[i]nsurance policies are almost always drafted by insurers, and
they should be certain that limitations in their coverage are clear enough for a layperson to
understand. Insurers should not be permitted to exploit policy term ambiguities, which they could
have avoided, to deny coverage to an unsuspecting insured.”).
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Although the Seventh Circuit did not address the value of the brain scan
to the issue of whether congenital encephalopathy that manifests itself
through a range of behavioral problems is a physical or mental illness,
the Court did reference the competing standards—cause of the condition
versus how the average layperson perceives the condition77—before
deciding to hold that the plan’s use of the undefined phrase “mental
illness” is ambiguous as applied to patients like James who have mental
disorders caused by organic illnesses.78
Finally, in a pair of decisions issued in 2006 and 2007, in the case
of Fitts v. Unum Life Insurance Company, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia addressed several questions relating
to the insurance coverage of bipolar disorder.79 The issue before the
District Court in the 2006 decision was whether bipolar disorder, if
proved, would be subject to the mental illness cap set forth in the
defendant’s disability insurance policy.80 The plaintiff called a
physician to testify that bipolar disorder is a neurobiological disorder
that affects the physical and chemical structures of the brain:
He explain[ed] that it may be characterized by certain physical
occurrences, including degenerative changes observed in the brain, and
a progressive loss of hippocampal cells in the brain. In addition, he
stated that depressive episodes associated with bipolar disorder are
generally accompanied by large outpourings of corticosteroids (stress
hormones) from the adrenal gland, which are damaging to a number of
areas of the brain. . . . [He] ultimately conclude[d] that bipolar disorder
is a physical illness because it is a disease afflicting a physical organ of

77. Id. at 308 (stating that “Lincoln acknowledges that the Plan provides no definition of
mental illness, but nevertheless insists that the term plainly encompasses illnesses like the one
afflicting James because ‘the average layperson, by merely observing James’ broad range of
psychiatric and behavioral symptoms and the nature of his treatment, would conclude that he was
suffering from and being treated for a mental illness or disorder.’ In Lincoln’s view, the cause of an
illness is irrelevant in determining whether an illness is physical or mental. This is in direct conflict
with Phillips’ view that because James’ condition flows from an organic defect, he is suffering from
a physical illness, with behavioral and emotional manifestations.”) (italicized emphasis in original;
internal references omitted).
78. Id. at 310-11.
79. Fitts v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33397, at *2 (D.C. May 7, 2007); Fitts
v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9235, at *12 (D.C. Feb 23, 2006).
80. Fitts, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9235, at *12 (stating “[the insured] alleges that the term
‘mental illness’ should be defined to exclude any ailment that has a physical or biological basis.
Pursuant to that definition, she maintains that her sickness, bipolar disorder, is not a mental illness
because it has physical, biological, and genetic components.”).
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the body, just like diseases affecting the heart, the kidneys, or the
81
liver.

Several of the insurer’s witnesses also conceded in deposition
testimony that bipolar disorder has biological components.82 The
insurer, on the other hand, contended that bipolar disorder is a mental
illness subject to the lower benefit caps because bipolar disorder is
included within the DSM-IV’s classification of mental disorders83 (even
though the DSM-IV acknowledges that no good distinction between
physical and mental disorders exists84), and because “there are no
physical conditions that must be present for a person to be diagnosed
with the disorder.”85 In the end, the District Court construed the
definition of mental illness against the insurer and held that bipolar
disorder was covered under the better set of benefits.86
The issue before the District Court in the 2007 opinion was whether
the plaintiff actually had bipolar disorder.87 The insurer contended that
the plaintiff did not have bipolar disorder for two alternative reasons;
that is, that no brain scans showed any changes in the plaintiff’s brain
and, in the alternative, that bipolar disorder cannot yet be diagnosed with
a brain scan.88 The Court, perhaps confused by the insurer’s pro-brain
scan and then con-brain scan argument, ruled in favor of the plaintiff.89
Since the time of these cases, and as discussed in more detail below
in Part III, both Congress and many state legislatures have passed laws
that require some (but certainly not all) health insurance plans to provide
some (but not necessarily complete) parity in their coverage of physical
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at *12-13 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at *13, n. 6.
Id. at *15.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS, Fourth Edition xxx (4th ed., Text Rev., 2000) (stating that “[a]lthough this
volume is titled the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the term mental
disorder unfortunately implies a distinction between ‘mental’ disorders and ‘physical’ disorders that
is a reductionistic anachronism of mind/body dualism. A compelling literature documents that there
is much ‘physical’ in ‘mental’ disorders and much ‘mental’ in ‘physical’ disorders. The problem
raised by the term ‘mental’ disorders has been much clearer than its solution, and, unfortunately, the
term persists in the title of the DSM-IV because we have not found an appropriate substitute.”)
(emphasis in original).
85. Fitts, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9235, at *16.
86. Id. at *24-25.
87. Fitts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33397, at *2.
88. Id. at *25.
89. Id. at *25-26. (stating that “[a]lthough bipolar disorder is an organic brain disorder
associated with physiological changes in the brain, there is no test that reveals or confirms the
diagnosis of bipolar disorder, and [the plaintiff] cannot be required to produce what does not exist in
order to prevail.”) (internal citations omitted).
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and mental health conditions. For those health insurance plans that are
not regulated by a federal or state parity law (including public programs
such as the Medicaid Program90) and for regulated insurance plans based
in states with incomplete parity laws, the outcome of a plaintiff’s case
against the insurer for the better set of benefits will depend on whether
and how the plan defines mental illness and how the court interprets
either the definition or the undefined phrase.
One question is whether and how advances in neuroscience,
including structural and functional neuroimaging, will impact the scope
of insurance coverage disputes. Based on litigants’ liberal use of
psychiatric, psychological, and neuroimaging evidence to support brainbased claims, starting in the late 1980s, as well as stakeholders’ use of
neuroimaging evidence in mental health parity debates and disability
claim proceedings, as discussed in Parts III-V, infra, I would anticipate
plaintiffs’ continued use of the behavioral and brain sciences to argue
that certain mental disorders are biological in nature and therefore
deserving of benefits applicable to physical illnesses. Given decisions in
cases such as Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc. v. Doe,91 which
found that bipolar disorder was an illness of the brain that stemmed from
physical and biological causes,92 I also anticipate that plaintiffs’
neuroscience-based claims may have some success in jurisdictions that
look to the cause or origin of the plaintiff’s disorder, especially if the
disorder is one of the better known DSM-IV Axis I clinical disorders
(such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder), or Axis III general medical
conditions that plays a role in the development, continuance, or
exacerbation of an Axis I and II disorder (such as a brain injury or AIDS
that can result in symptoms of mental illness).
In cases involving other mental disorders, I suspect that the
outcome will depend on whether that jurisdiction focuses on origin,
treatment, manifestation, or symptoms,93 as well as whether the “first

90. See, e.g., Brunalli, supra note 43, at 622 (discussing the non-application of many state
parity laws to public health insurance programs); TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, MEDICAID
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESSES, http://www.psychlaws.org
/GeneralResources/fact12.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2008) (noting that “[w]hile the federal
government seeks ‘parity’ for treatment of lesser forms of mental illness by private insurers, it
continues to discriminate against those with severe mental illnesses by denying them coverage
under Medicaid when they require hospitalization in a psychiatric hospital.”).
91. Ark. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc. v. Doe, 733 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987).
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Phillips, 978 F.2d at 310-11 (noting that different jurisdictions use competing
definitions of mental illness); Fitts, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9235, at *19 (noting that the courts have
relied on at least three different approaches for defining mental illness).
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impression” symptoms are physical (e.g., starvation and dehydration) or
behavioral (e.g., delusions and hallucinations) and, if behavioral, the
ability of the plaintiff’s experts to convince the jury that such behavior is
brain-based. Given the ready (Internet) availability of neuroimaging
studies finding that emotion may be correlated with blood oxygenation
level dependent (BOLD) activity in the limbic system,94 attention may
be correlated with BOLD activity in the right caudate nucleus and
globus pallidus,95 motor activity may be correlated with BOLD activity
in the primary motor cortex,96 perception may be correlated with
changes in the sensory association cortex,97 working memory may be
correlated with BOLD activity in the prefrontal cortex,98 and so on,99 I
anticipate that aggressive plaintiffs may try to argue the brain-basis of
the many signs and symptoms of mental illness, including those relating
to emotion (e.g., depression, mania, anxiety, and flat affect),
consciousness (e.g., decreased attention span, disorientation, and
delirium), motor behavior (e.g., underactivity, overactivity, and
compulsive movements), perception (e.g., auditory and visual
hallucinations and other distortions of real events), long- and short-term
memory impairments, speech, insight, and thinking (including thoughts
of persecution or Apocryphal doom).100 I also anticipate that defendants,
like the defendant in Fitts v. Unum Life Insurance Company, may
respond by arguing either that mental disorders cannot yet be diagnosed
by a brain scan or that the plaintiff failed to introduce a brain scan that
would have provided objective evidence of a mental disorder.101

94. NEIL R. CARLSON, PHYSIOLOGY OF BEHAVIOR 335 (6th ed. 1998).
95. J.M. De La Fuente et al., Brain Glucose Metabolism in Borderline Personality Disorder,
31 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 531, 537 (1997).
96. CARLSON, supra note 94, at 234.
97. Id. at 437.
98. Id.
99. Brian Doherty, ‘You Can’t See Why on an fMRI’: What Science Can and Can’t Tell Us
about the Insanity Defense, REASON ONLINE, July 2007, http://www.reason.com/news/show
/120266.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2008) (noting the frequency with which expert witnesses testify in
legal proceedings and “reclassify complicated moral and legal questions as seemingly clear-cut,
[brain-based,] scientific matters.”).
100. See, e.g., Appendix A (summarizing recent structural and functional neuroimaging studies
in the context of mental disorders); Dawn Capp & Joan G. Esnayra, It’s All in Your Head—Defining
Psychiatric Disabilities as Physical Disabilities, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 97, 106-14 (2000)
(examining the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and genetic correlates of the signs and symptoms
of many mental disorders).
101. See Fitts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33397, at *25 (stating that “Unum contends that [the
plaintiff] does not have bipolar disorder because there are no brain studies showing changes in her
brain. Yet Unum concedes that bipolar disorder ‘cannot be diagnosed with a brain scan.’”) (internal
references omitted).
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How should we assess these neuroscience-based claims? Scholars
already have laid the groundwork for evaluating claims made about
fMRI-lie detectors in terms of meeting relevance and reliability
requirements set forth in civil and criminal rules of evidence.102 In
scope-of-insurance lawsuits involving functional neuroimaging
evidence, litigants very well may have similar evidentiary defenses
based on many of the same relevancy and reliability problems. These
include, but certainly are not limited to, underlying problems with the
theory of neurovascular coupling, the time lag associated with blood
flow, the localization of neuronal activity, the statistical averaging of
images, paired image subtraction, subject selection, the number of
subjects and implications for statistical significance, as well as broader
philosophical concerns relating to the inherent sociocultural and
historical subjectivity of diagnosing and classifying psychiatric
conditions.103 A review of structural and functional neuroimaging
studies involving individuals with mental disorders reveals several
additional limitations, including the effect that different psychotropic
drug regimens, alcohol and illegal drug use (given the large number of
individuals who have mental disorders and co-occurring substance abuse
disorders), cigarette smoking, endocrine changes, nutritional differences,
and activity levels have for study results, as well as the extent to which
the duration and severity of the subjects’ mental illnesses may have
contributed to the magnitude of any structural changes or functional
differences identified during the study.104 Finally, insurers also have a
range of substantive and normative defenses; that is, that statutory cost
containment,105 lack of medical necessity,106 and other reasons justify the
102. See, e.g., Pettit, supra note 10; Kittay, supra note 10; Egan, supra note 10; Downie &
Murphy, supra note 10; Keckler, supra note 10; Alexander, supra note 10.
103. See, e.g., Grace E. Jackson, A Curious Consensus: “Brain Scans Prove Disease?,” L.
PROJECT PSYCHIATRIC RTS., http://psychrights.org/Articles/GEJacksonMDBrainScanCurious
Consensus.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2008) (discussing limitations on the use of functional
neuroimaging for psychiatric diagnosis).
104. See, e.g., Robert B. Zipursky, Imaging Mental Disorders in the 21st Century, 52
CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 133, 133 (2007).
105. See, e.g., Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(2) (allowing insurers to
opt out of parity if parity raises overall plan costs by more than one percent); Mental Health Parity
Act of 2007, S. 558, 110th Cong., § 712a(e)(1-2) (2007) (exempting from parity group health plans
whose compliance would increase total costs by more than 2% during the first year or by more than
1% each subsequent year).
106. See, e.g., William M. Glazer, Psychiatry and Medical Necessity, 22(7) PSYCHIATRIC
ANNALS 362, 362-65 (1992) (discussing insurers’ application of the medical necessity requirement
in the context of reimbursement for treatment of psychiatric conditions; identifying key factors that
underlie the concept of medical necessity in psychiatric practice); Nancy W. Miller, What Is
Medical Necessity?, PHYSICIAN’S NEWS DIG. (Aug. 2002) (stating that “[there are] as many
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insurers’ coverage refusal regardless of the merit of plaintiffs’
neuroscience-based claims.
Finally, I anticipate that increased public understanding of the
behavioral and brain sciences may impact the application of the
layperson standard in jurisdictions that follow it. Remember the Eighth
Circuit case in which the court stated that the test of whether a condition
is physical or mental depends on how a reasonable layperson would
understand or perceive the condition?107 That case was decided in 1990,
at the beginning of the Decade of the Brain,108 when the public may not
have known too much about the causes of mental illness. In the eighteen
years since then, the public has been inundated with information
regarding the treatable organic basis of many mental disorders. For
example, on March 16, 1993, The New York Times made public the
findings of a confidential government report exploring health reform for
individuals with mental disorders.109 The report, authored by the
National Advisory Mental Health Council, stated that, “contrary to
persistent myth, mental illnesses are both real and definable”110 and that
“the efficacy of an extensive array of treatments for specific mental
disorders has been systematically tested in controlled clinical trials [and]
demonstrate[s] that mental disorders can now be diagnosed and treated
as precisely and effectively as are other disorders in medicine.”111
Steven Hyman, former Director of the NIMH, referenced several
neuroimaging studies when he told Congress in 1996 that mental
disorders are diseases of the brain:

definitions of medical necessity as there are payors, laws and courts to interpret them. Generally
speaking, though, most definitions incorporate the principle of providing services which are
‘reasonable and necessary’ or ‘appropriate’ in light of clinical standards of practice . . . . Medicare
defines ‘medical necessity’ as services or items reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or
treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body member. While
that sounds like a hard and fast rule, consider that CMS (formerly HCFA) has the power under the
Social Security Act to determine if the method of treating a patient in the particular case is
reasonable and necessary on a case-by-case basis.”); Sabin & Daniels, supra note 18, at 5
(examining medical necessity in the context of mental health care).
107. Brewer, 921 F.2d at 154 (stating that “laypersons are inclined to focus on the symptoms of
an illness; illnesses whose primary symptoms are depression, mood swings and unusual behavior
are commonly characterized as mental illnesses regardless of their cause .”).
108. Library of Congress, Project on Decade of the Brain, http://www.loc.gov/loc/brain/ (last
visited Jan. 30, 2008).
109. Pear, supra note 36, at A1 (citing National Advisory Mental Health Council, Health Care
Reform for Americans with Severe Mental Illnesses, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1447 (1993)).
110. Pear, supra note 36, at A1.
111. National Advisory Mental Health Council, Health Care Reform for Americans with
Severe Mental Illnesses: Report of the National Advisory Mental Health Council, 150 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1447, at Abstract (1993).
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[T]he accumulating weight of the evidence [and] the great bulk of it
resulting from NIMH-sponsored research demonstrates that mental
disorders are brain diseases. . . . We now know that individuals with
schizophrenia have abnormalities in the size of their cerebral
ventricles, those fluid-filled cavities in the brain; simply put, in
schizophrenia, we see irregularities in the ratio of brain tissue to fluid
in the brain. NIMH-sponsored research also has provided compelling
evidence that the connections of nerve cells in the brain, the circuits
that underlie the processing of thoughts and emotions, do not develop
or function normally in patients with schizophrenia . . . [Current]
scientific techniques demonstrate beyond doubt that schizophrenia is a
112
primary brain disorder.

In 1999, Surgeon General David Satcher released an influential
report in which he referenced research in basic neuroscience, behavioral
science, and behavioral genetics to support the characterization of
mental health disorders as “real health conditions” for which “a range of
treatments exist.”113 And, since 1999, the public has been overwhelmed
with news regarding advances in neuroimaging, neurointerventions, and
the behavioral and brain sciences:114
An endless stream of news stories about the latest advances in brain
scans and the chemical conquest of personality enhances the experts’
credibility and feeds into a belief that we have come to a sophisticated
115
understanding of the intersection between mind, brain, and behavior.

As the public continues to receive this information, I suspect the
application of the reasonable layperson test in health insurance coverage
112. Hearing before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health & Human Serv., Educ. & Related
Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong. 363, 375 (1996) (statement of Steven
Hyman, Dir., Nat’l Inst. Mental Health, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.).
113. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL, Executive Summary at vii (1999), http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/
mentalhealth/pdfs/ExSummary-Final.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2008) (stating that “[t]he U.S.
Congress declared the 1990s the Decade of the Brain. In this decade we have learned much through
research—in basic neuroscience, behavioral science, and genetics—about the complex workings of
the brain. Research can help us gain a further understanding of the fundamental mechanisms
underlying thought, emotion, and behavior—and an understanding of what goes wrong in the brain
in mental illness. It can also lead to better treatments and improved services for our diverse
population.”); id. at iv.
114. See, e.g., Jason Pontin, Mind Over Matter, with a Machine’s Help, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,
2007, at F3; Sandra Blakeslee, A Small Part of the Brain and Its Profound Effects, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
6, 2007, at F6; Sandra Blakeslee, Just What’s Going on Inside that Head of Yours? N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2000, at F6; Holcomb B. Noble, Pain at Work: Startling Images and New Hope, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 1999, at F1.
115. Doherty, supra note 99.
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disputes may begin to swing in favor of plaintiffs who claim that their
mental disorders are physical in nature.116
III. THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY DEBATE
In the early 1990s, many patients and patient advocacy
organizations began to lobby Congress and state legislatures for health
insurance parity, reasoning that there is no biological justification for the
unequal insurance coverage of mental and physical conditions by health
insurance plans.117 Insurers responded with a multi-layered costcontainment defense. By limiting mental health coverage, insurers
claimed that they could reduce costs, maintain premium levels, and
cover more individuals.118 Insurers also claimed that increased mental
health benefits would give rise to adverse selection; that is, that
consumers with mental health conditions that required expensive
treatments would select those plans that provided coverage for such
treatments.119 Insurers also expressed concern that consumer demand
for mental health treatment would be highly responsive to the presence
of insurance coverage120 and that consumers would seek treatment and
reimbursement for “frivolous” emotional conditions and other mental
disorders characterized by diagnostic ambiguity and uncertain treatment
success.121 Indeed, the Commerce and Industry Association of New
Jersey opposed legislative efforts to expand mental health benefits in the
State of New Jersey for fear that the legislation “would uncover
unworthy disorders such as shyness, boastfulness, fetishism, and
impulsiveness.”122 The New Jersey Business and Industry Association
116. Shannon, supra note 29, at 75.
117. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 26, at 99 (stating that “[n]owhere is the gap between science
and society more pronounced than in health benefit coverage for mental illness.”); LaFratta, supra
note 26, at 405-06 (setting forth arguments in favor of parity); Kaplan, supra note 34, at 328 (noting
that “[t]he parity movement came to popular attention in the early 1990s.”).
118. See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 44, at 186 (stating that “[r]esistance to such legislation centers
on concerns over cost, diagnostic and prognostic indeterminacy, and ambiguity at the line dividing
medical from non-medical treatments important to the seriously mentally ill.”); Maggie D. Gold,
Must Insurers Treat All Illnesses Equally? – Mental vs. Physical Illness: Congressional and
Administrative Failure to End Limitations to and Exclusions from Coverage for Mental Illness in
Employer-Provided Health Benefits under the Mental Health Parity Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 767, 773 (1998) (explaining insurer arguments against parity
legislation).
119. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 118, at 774-77 (1998) (applying theories of moral hazard to
mental health insurance coverage); LaFratta, supra note 26, at 405 (applying the same).
120. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Subsidizing Addiction: Do State Health
Insurance Mandates Increase Alcohol Consumption?, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 175, 176 (2006).
121. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 118, at 774-77; LaFratta, supra note 26, at 405.
122. See Kaplan, supra note 34, at 338, n. 97.
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similarly worried that the legislation would require insurers to cover less
serious mental disorders listed in the DSM-IV, including “sibling
relational problems and caffeine addiction.”123 Stakeholders in favor of
mental health parity responded, of course, by offering evidence that the
diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders is precise, effective, and
successful.124
By the mid-1990s, proponents of mental health parity had achieved
some success at the federal and state level.125 At the federal level,
Congress passed the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (the 1996
MHPA), which required group health plans offering a mental health
benefit in conjunction with medical and surgical benefits to provide
equality for any annual or lifetime aggregate spending caps imposed
within the plan.126 A regulated group health plan that offered a lifetime
cap of $1 million for treatment for physical illnesses, for example, would
be required to establish a $1 million cap for treatment of mental
disorders. The 1996 MHPA did not, however, require covered health
plans to actually offer a mental health benefit.127 Nor did it prohibit
covered plans from imposing higher copayments or deductibles for
mental health services, placing different limits on numbers of visits or
days of coverage, or otherwise establishing different cost-sharing
ratios.128 Thus, a regulated group health plan could reimburse a patient
100% of the cost of a visit to an orthopedic surgeon, but only 50% of the
cost of a visit to a psychiatrist.129 The 1996 MHPA also did not apply to
small businesses that employed between two and fifty employees.130 Its
parity provisions did not extend to substance abuse treatments.131 It also
contained a provision allowing insurers to opt out of parity if parity
raised overall plan costs by more than one percent132 and, finally, a
sunset provision which phased out parity requirements for benefits

123. See id. at 338, n. 98.
124. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 118, at 777.
125. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 26, at 94-95. See also Mental Health America, Mental
Health Parity Timelines, http://www1.nmha.org/state/parity/parityTimeline.cfm (last visited Jan. 3,
2008).
126. Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 702(a), 110 Stat. 2944 (Sept. 26,
1996), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(1-2) (1996).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(b)(1) (1996).
128. Id. § 1185a(b)(2).
129. See, e.g., The Senate Approves the “2007 Mental Health Parity Act”: Achieving Equal
Treatment
for
the
Mentally
Ill,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.
pl?page=/colb/20071001.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(1)(A) and (B).
131. Id. at § 1185a(e)(4).
132. Id. at § 1185a(c)(2).
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furnished on or after September 30, 2001 and, after renewal of the sunset
provision, after December 31, 2006.133
Mental health parity continues to be an issue at the federal level.
As of early February 2008, there are competing versions of a new mental
health parity bill in the House and the Senate.134 Some mental health
advocates believe that the new legislation, if passed, will represent a
substantial improvement over the 1996 MHPA. The Senate version, for
example, extends the federal parity mandate to deductibles, coinsurance,
and the number of visits each year.135 The Senate version still does not
require regulated group health plans to offer a mental health benefit,
however,136 and it also contains an exemption for group health plans
whose compliance would increase total costs by more than two percent
during the first year or by more than one percent each subsequent
year.137
Many state legislatures have enacted their own mental health parity
laws, which vary widely in scope.138 Some of these laws require
insurers to offer mental health benefits and to provide full parity
between physical and mental health benefits; some laws require insurers
to offer optional mental health coverage; some laws require insurers to
offer mental health benefits equal to medical health benefits but only if
mental health benefits are offered; some laws require a minimum level

133. Id. at § 1185a(f). See generally Nelson, supra note 26, at 103-05 (discussing the
limitations of the 1996 MHPA).
134. Paul Wellstone Addiction and Mental Equity Act of 2007, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong., (1st
Sess. 2007); Mental Health Parity Act, S. 558, 110th Cong. §558 (1st Sess. 2007) (being “a bill to
provide parity between health insurance coverage of mental health benefits . . . for medical and
surgical services . . . .”).
135. See, e.g., The Senate Approves the “2007 Mental Health Parity Act”: Achieving Equal
Treatment for the Mentally Ill, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=/
colb/20071001.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2008) (stating that “the new law would signal progress in
the acceptance of mental illness as a ‘real’ medical condition, one that deserves the same
accommodation and concern as heart disease or cancer. Such acceptance could diminish the stigma
attached to people who suffer from these conditions and could, accordingly, motivate people who
might otherwise feel ashamed to seek care when they need it.”).
136. Mental Health Parity Act, S. 558, 110th Cong. § 712a(a), (2007) (requiring only parity for
a group health plan that “provides both medical and surgical benefits and mental health benefits”).
137. Id. at § 712a(e)(1)-(2).
138. See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 44, at 190-91 (summarizing state mental health parity laws);
Michele Garvin et al., Mental Health Parity: The Massachusetts Experience in Context, 47 B. B.J.
18, 19 (May/June 2003) (summarizing the same); National Conference of State Legislatures, State
Laws
Mandating
or
Regulating
Mental
Health
Benefits
(Nov.
1,
2007),
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/mentalben.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2008) (summarizing the
same).
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of coverage for mental health benefits; and some laws contain yet other
variations.139
One question is whether advances in neuroscience will impact
mental health parity interpretations or applications at the federal or state
level. I think they may in three different ways. The first way relates to
the way in which litigants or courts interpret the mental health benefits
that are subject to a parity mandate. Note that the original 1996 MHPA
defined mental health benefits as “benefits with respect to mental health
services, as defined under the terms of the plan or coverage (as the case
may be), but [not including] benefits with respect to treatment of
substance abuse or chemical dependency.”140 In the Senate version of
the 2007 mental health parity bill, mental health benefits are similarly
defined, although substance abuse benefits are now included as are any
other benefits required under state law.141 If the Senate version passes,
then regulated group health plans may have the flexibility to define
narrowly the mental health conditions subject to the parity mandate
unless State law contains a broader definition.142
Many State laws do contain (not necessarily broader but) more
specific descriptions of the mental health benefits that are subject to the
State’s parity mandate.143 Connecticut, for example, mandates insurance
coverage for most conditions listed in the DSM-IV.144 Mississippi
mandates insurance coverage for any psychiatric disease identified in the
current edition of The International Classification of Diseases.145
Montana mandates parity for seven disorders: schizophrenia,
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, major depression, panic

139. Garvin et al., supra note 138, at 19.
140. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(e)(4) (1996).
141. Mental Health Parity Act of 2007, S. 558, 110th Cong. summary of legislation, (1st Sess.
2007) (defining mental health benefits as “benefits with respect to mental health services (including
substance abuse treatment) as defined under the terms of the group health plan or coverage, and
when applicable as may be defined under State law when applicable to health insurance coverage
offered in connection with a group health plan.”). The House version of the bill would use chapter
89 of title 5 of the United States Code to determine those mental health benefits subject to parity.
Paul Wellstone Addiction and Mental Equity Act of 2007, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
See generally Kevin Diaz, With Mental Health Bill Mired, Ramstad’s Legacy at Stake,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, Jan. 29, 2008 (discussing the Senate and House versions and their
likelihood of passing).
142. See Diaz, supra note 141.
143. See, e.g., Brunalli, supra note 43, at 601 (describing different states’ definitions of mental
illness); Michael J. Carroll, The Mental Health Parity Act of 1996: Let It Sunset if Real Changes Are
Not Made, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 553, 570-71 (2004) (describing the same).
144. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-514(a) (2008) (excluding caffeine use disorders and other less
serious mental disorders).
145. MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-9-37(f) (2008).
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disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and autism.146 New Hampshire
adds to that list anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, pervasive
developmental disorder, and chronic post-traumatic stress disorder.147
New Jersey mandates insurance coverage for
a mental or nervous condition that is caused by a biological disorder of
the brain and results in a clinically significant or psychological
syndrome or pattern that substantially limits the functioning of the
person with the illness, including, but not limited to, schizophrenia,
schizoaffective disorder, major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder,
paranoia and other psychotic disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder,
148
panic disorder and pervasive developmental disorder or autism.

Nebraska expressly ties its current definition of serious mental
illness to the state of medical science: “any mental health condition that
current medical science affirms is caused by a biological disorder of the
brain and that substantially limits the life activities of the person with the
serious mental illness.”149 Many scholars also urge the adoption of
mental disorder definitions that are tied to the current state of medical
science:
Congress should pass legislation requiring full parity between certain
biologically based mental illnesses and physical illnesses. Such a bill
should initially include a very small list of disorders with the clearest
scientific backing for their biological bases . . . . [I]t would be a
relatively simple matter to amend the law in the future to add any other
diagnoses that achieve wide scientific recognition as a biologically
150
based brain disorder.

Given litigants’ liberal use of expert psychiatric, psychological, and
neuroimaging evidence to support brain-based claims starting in the late
1980s, I suspect that in States such as New Jersey that mandate
insurance coverage for “a mental or nervous condition that is caused by
a biological disorder of the brain,”151 plaintiffs may rely on structural
and functional neuroimaging findings in an attempt to prove that their
mental disorders are biological and therefore subject to the parity
mandate. Note that any neuroscience-based “evidence” would not
necessarily be sufficient for the plaintiff; in some states, she still would

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
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be required to prove that her mental disorder substantially limits her
functioning, which may require additional medical or social evidence
regarding her inability to work or complete other activities of daily
living.152
In States such as Nebraska that expressly define protected mental
health benefits in terms of whether “current medical science affirms [that
the disorder] is caused by a biological disorder of the brain,”153 or in
States that follow some pieces of scholarly advice and define protected
mental health benefits in terms of those disorders “with the clearest
scientific backing for their biological bases” and “that achieve wide
scientific recognition as a biologically based brain disorder,”154 I suspect
that aggressive plaintiffs also may rely on recent structural or functional
neuroimaging studies in an attempt to establish a scientific backing for
their claims in light of the dozens of well-publicized and readily
available neuroimaging studies finding structural differences or
functional associations between changes in regional blood oxygenation
and conditions such as mild geriatric depression,155 post-traumatic
stress,156 panic attacks,157 borderline personality disorder,158 eating
disorders,159 substance use disorders (in states that do not expressly
include substance use disorders within their illustrative list of protected
mental health benefits),160 and so on. Again, insurers would have an

152. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27A-7.5 (2007) (mandating insurance coverage for “a
mental or nervous condition . . . that substantially limits the functioning of the person with the
illness . . . .”).
153. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-792(5)(b) (2008).
154. Carroll, supra note 143, at 579, 582.
155. See, e.g., Yonggui Yuan et al., White Matter Integrity of the Whole Brain Is Disrupted in
First-Episode Remitted Geriatric Depression, 18(17) NEUROREPORT 1845 (2007).
156. See, e.g., Noriyuki Kitayama et al., Morphologic Alterations in the Corpus Callosum in
Abuse-Related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Preliminary Study, 195(12) J. NERVOUS &
MENTAL DISORDERS 1027 (2007).
157. See, e.g., Shutaro Nakaaki et al., A Case of Frontotemporal Lobar Degeneration (FTLD)
with Panic Attack as the First Symptom, 19(4) J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES
485, 486 (2007).
158. See, e.g., Jon E. Grant et al., Frontal White Matter Integrity in Borderline Personality
Disorder with Self-Injurious Behavior, 19(4) J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES
383 (2007).
159. See, e.g., Mark Mühlau et al., Gray Matter Decrease of the Anterior Cingulate Cortex in
Anorexia Nervosa, 164(12) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1850 (2007); Angela Wagner et al., Altered Reward
Processing in Women Recovered from Anorexia Nervosa, 164(12) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1842 (2007);
Section 4 of Appendix A to this Article (summarizing recent neuroimaging findings in the context
of eating disorders).
160. See, e.g., Section 3 of Appendix A to this Article (summarizing recent neuroimaging
findings in the context of substance use and abuse).
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evidentiary defense161 as well as a range of substantive and normative
defenses; that is, that cost containment,162 lack of medical necessity,163 or
other reasons justify insurers’ refusal to cover the extra mental disorders
regardless of the merit of plaintiffs’ neuroscience-based claims.
Thus, one way in which advances in neuroimaging may impact
mental health parity law relates to the interpretation of the mental health
benefits that are subject to a parity mandate. A second way such
advances may impact mental health parity law is to provide support for
the passage of parity legislation in states that do not have such
legislation or support for more stringent parity legislation at the federal
or state level. When the Texas Legislature was considering a mental
health parity bill in 1991, Senator Mike Moncrief (D-Fort Worth), the
bill’s sponsor, wanted the Texas Legislature to understand why he was
concerned about insurers’ willingness to cover treatments for
neurological disorders such as Parkinson’s disease but not mental
Senator Moncrief told the
disorders such as schizophrenia.164
Legislature that the disparate treatment was illogical because both
conditions involve an imbalance of the same chemical: “‘[The] chemical
factor in the brain involved in both of these diseases is the same; it’s
dopamine. One disease involves an overabundance of dopamine while
the other is a shortage of the identical neurotransmitter.’”165 I anticipate
that proponents of mental health parity legislation will continue to use
neuroscience to illustrate what they perceive to be illogical or unjust
coverage discrepancies.166 For example, in a 2004 essay published in the
Harvard Journal on Legislation, Representative Patrick Kennedy (DR.I.) argued that, “In the face of a growing body of scientific literature
documenting the biochemical nature of mental illnesses, the status quo
of insurance discrimination against those who suffer from such illnesses

161. See, e.g., Pettit, supra note 10; Kittay, supra note 10; Egan, supra note 10; Downie &
Murphy, supra note 10; Keckler, supra note 10; Alexander, supra note 10.
162. See, e.g., the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(2) (allowing
insurers to opt out of parity if parity raises overall plan costs more than one percent); Mental Health
Parity Act of 2007, S. 558, 110th Cong. § 712a(e)(1) and (2) (2007) (exempting from parity group
health plans whose compliance would increase total costs by more than 2% during the first year or
by more than 1% each subsequent year).
163. See, e.g., Sabin & Daniels, supra note 18, at 5 (discussing medical necessity in the context
of mental health care).
164. Carroll, supra note 143, at 579 (citing Tex. Floor Debate, 71st Leg. Reg. Sess. (Apr. 25,
1991) (Statement of Sen. Moncrief) (transcript available from Senate Journal Office).
165. Id.
166. Beth Mellen Harrison, Mental Health Parity, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 255, 265 (2002)
(stating that “given these advances in research, there is no scientific justification for treating mental
health services differently than general medical services.”).
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is indefensible.”167 Kennedy cited three National Institute of Mental
Health (NIMH) research summaries noting that NIMH investigators had
discovered “specific, subtle abnormalities in the structure and function
of the brains of patients with schizophrenia,” that “one of the most
consistent findings to date has been the appearance of specific
abnormalities, or lesions, in the white matter of the brain in patients with
bipolar disorder,” and that “animal research suggests that ‘different
anxiety disorders may be associated with activation in different parts of
the amygdala.’”168 Kennedy concluded: “In an era when researchers are
churning out ever more science exploring the biochemical and
physiological causes and effects of mental illnesses, there is no excuse
for such differential treatment.”169 Kennedy is now the lead sponsor of
the House version of the 2007 mental health parity bill.170
A third way in which mental health parity advocates may use
neuroscience is to argue that federal and state disability law provisions
applicable to employers and places of public accommodation should
prohibit insurers from offering unequal benefits. Given that courts have
long held that unequal benefits do not violate disability law, including
the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),171 even though these
laws were designed to prevent discrimination against qualified
individuals with disabilities on the basis of such disabilities, I do not
think these efforts will be successful. However, I anticipate that scholars
and other disability advocates will continue to emphasize the legitimacy
of mental disorders and advances in neuroscience in an attempt to gather
support for ADA-mandated mental health parity.172
In summary, stakeholders are using advances in neuroscience to
impact the scope of insurance benefits and the mental health parity
167. Representative Patrick J. Kennedy, Why We Must End Insurance Discrimination Against
Mental Health Care, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 367 (2004).
168. Id. at 367, n.39.
169. Id. at 374-75.
170. Paul Wellstone Addiction and Mental Equity Act of 2007, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2007.).
171. See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 44, at 188-89 (discussing the non-application of the ADA to
insurance disparities); Diane Serritella, Employer and Insurers Not Obligated by the ADA to
Provide Equal Benefit Plans for Physical and Mental Disabilities, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 112, 112-14
(2000) (discussing the 2000 Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. case, in which the Ninth
Circuit held that a group disability insurance policy offered as a fringe benefit that provided better
benefits for physical disabilities did not violate the ADA and analogous state law).
172. See, e.g., Signorello, supra note 29, at 350 (calling for the recognition of mental illness as
“the legitimate, typically treatable, and widespread ailment that it is.”); Gardner, supra note 31, at
708 (stating that “modern neuroscience is leading the charge in allowing us to understand mental
illness, and it continues to provide evidence that the distinction between mental and physical illness
is often false.”).
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debate in a variety of ways. The major theme underlying these efforts is
that mental disorders are biological in nature and therefore any disparate
treatment is illogical, unjust, or both. Note that if stakeholders convince
“the law” that physical and mental illnesses are one and the same, then
many mental health insurance coverage disputes and the mental health
parity debate will be moot.173
IV. THE SCOPE OF PROTECTED STATUS UNDER DISABILITY LAW
Elsewhere I have examined relatively low-hanging neuro-disability
law fruit, such as which physical and mental health conditions examined
during structural and functional neuroimaging studies may constitute
disabilities under the ADA, whether an fMRI examination would be
considered a regulated medical examination under the ADA, and
whether the ADA and other disability, health, and civil rights laws
provide any confidentiality and privacy protections to individuals whose
brains are scanned using fMRI.174 Here, I would like to examine the
broader question of whether and how neuroscience might impact the
scope of protected status under federal and state disability law.
A range of discrimination protections and accommodations are
available to qualified individuals who have physical and mental
disabilities under a number of different federal and state laws. The
federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, for example, prohibits employers and
organizations that receive federal financial assistance from
discriminating on the basis of disability against qualified individuals
with disabilities.175 The ADA, passed by Congress in 1990, prohibits
certain employers, state and local government agencies, and places of
public accommodation from discriminating on the basis of disability
against qualified individuals with disabilities and requires the provision
of reasonable accommodations unless it would cause an undue
hardship.176 State laws such as the California Fair Housing and
Employment Act also provide individuals with protection from
harassment and discrimination in employment because of physical or

173. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 34, at 360 (stating “[i]ronically, when these misconceptions
disappear, the federal and state governments may not have to mandate coverage for mental
disorders.”).
174. Tovino, supra note 4, at Parts IV & V.
175. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2007).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2007); EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, SMALL
EMPLOYERS AND REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/accommodation.
html (last visited Feb. 4, 2008).
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mental disability.177 One theme underlying these federal and state laws
is that it is “wrong” to discriminate against individuals who have
physical and mental conditions over which they have no control, and that
it is “right” to accommodate them to help them participate more fully in
society.178
One question is how advances in neuroscience may impact federal
and state disability law. Neuroscience already is impacting policy
discussions about the scope of protected disability status. For illustrative
purposes only, let us consider Title I of the ADA, which prohibits certain
employers from discriminating on the basis of disability against
qualified individuals with disabilities179 and requires the provision of
reasonable accommodations unless such accommodations pose an undue
hardship.180 The ADA defines a disability as “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; a record of such an impairment; or being
regarded as having such an impairment.”181 The statute,182 several
different portions of the implementing regulations promulgated by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),183 a lengthy set
of interpretive guidelines,184 and hundreds of judicial opinions185 are
177. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (2007).
178. See, e.g., Ramona L. Paetzold, Mental Illness and Reasonable Accommodations at Work:
Definition of a Mental Disability under the ADA, 56(10) PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1188, 1190 (2005)
(noting that individuals with mental impairments who can completely control their symptoms
through medication may not be protected because they have control over their otherwise limiting
conditions). But see Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, The Supreme Court’s 1999 ADA
Decisions, http://bazelon.org/issues/disabilityrights/resources/99scotus.htm (last visited Feb. 4,
2008) (noting, on the other hand, that the ADA generally protects individuals with bipolar disorder
whose symptoms periodically arise even while taking medication). See also Timothy P. Ward,
Needing a Fix: Congress Should Amend the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 to Remove a
Record of Addiction as a Protected Disability, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 683, 719 (2005) (stating that
“[i]mplicit in Congress’s legitimate goal of protecting the disabled from discrimination is the idea
that discrimination against disabled persons is unfair because it is wrong to treat a person differently
based on circumstances or conditions over which he has no control.”).
179. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4 (2005).
180. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (2005).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2007) (Title I definition of disability).
182. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining disability); § 12111(8) (defining “[q]ualified
individual with a disability”); § 12114(a) (interpreting the definition of “[q]ualified individual with
a disability” in light of alcoholism and illegal drug use).
183. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. Part 1630.2(h)(2) (2007) (clarifying that a protected mental
impairment includes “any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.”).
184. See, e.g., Appendix to 29 C.F.R. § 1630 -- Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act Background (distinguishing protected mental impairments from unprotected characteristics for purposes of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h): “It is important to distinguish
between conditions that are impairments and physical, psychological, environmental, cultural and
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dedicated to distinguishing the conditions that will and will not result in
an individual’s protection under the statute.
For example, the statute itself clarifies that an employee or
applicant who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs is not
protected, although an individual is protected if she has successfully
completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program (or has otherwise
been successfully rehabilitated or is participating in a supervised
rehabilitation program) and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of
drugs.186 The interpretive guidelines also clarify that the illegal use of
drugs refers to both the use of unlawful drugs, such as cocaine, and the
unlawful use of prescription drugs.187 The interpretive guidelines
specify that the definition of “rehabilitation program” includes both
inpatient and outpatient programs, employee assistance programs,
professionally recognized self-help programs such as Narcotics
Anonymous, and other programs that provide professional (although not
necessarily medical) assistance and counseling to individuals who
illegally use drugs.188 At the end of the day, an individual who currently
uses (and may be addicted) to cocaine is not a protected individual with
a disability; however, an individual who previously used cocaine and has
been rehabilitated may bring an ADA claim against a covered employer
if the employer’s discriminatory action was taken because of the
individual’s record of addiction and the individual is qualified to obtain
or keep the job in question with or without reasonable
accommodations.189
Although few argue that current drug users should be protected
under disability law, there is some debate about the appropriateness of
protecting individuals with a past record of addiction. Over the past
decade, stakeholders have begun to use neuroscience to support
opposing views regarding the protection that should be afforded to past
drug addicts.

economic characteristics that are not impairments . . . . The definition, likewise, does not include
characteristic predisposition to illness or disease . . . . Similarly, the definition does not include
common personality traits such as poor judgment or a quick temper where these are not symptoms
of a mental or psychological disorder. Environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantages such as
poverty, lack of education or a prison record are not impairments.”).
185. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102, Notes of Decisions, 44-149 (2005) (listing hundreds of
cases that distinguish protected disabilities from unprotected conditions).
186. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a)-(b).
187. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(a)-(c), Appendix to Part 1630.
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 178, at 692.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009

31

Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 5

10-TOVINO_PUB_EDITS.DOC

500

4/14/2009 1:20 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[42:469

Consider the disease model of drug abuse and addiction put forth
by Richard Millstein, the former Deputy Director of the National
Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), and his coauthor Alan Leshner, former
Director of the NIDA, in a 1999 article published in a top-ranked health
law journal.190 In the second section of the article, Millstein and Leshner
reference an fMRI study to illustrate how cocaine use changes the brain
by leaving a “signature” on it.191 Throughout the remainder of the
article, the authors reference several other fMRI and positron emission
tomography (PET) studies investigating short and long-term changes in
individuals’ brains following use of Ecstasy, methamphetamine, cocaine,
and heroin as support for their two-part argument; that is, drug addiction
is a brain disease with contributions of biology, behavior, and
environment; and compulsive and uncontrollable drug craving, seeking,
and use is responsible for disruption, crime, and other negative drug
correlates.192 The authors’ thesis is that a disconnect exists between the
public’s perception of drug abuse and addiction (that addicts “d[o] it to
themselves”) and the scientific bases of drug abuse and addiction, and
that this disconnect has created barriers to treatment and re-entrance into
society.193
Not everyone buys Millstein’s and Leshner’s argument that health
and disability law should incorporate the disease model of drug
addiction.194 While opponents of Millstein and Leshner do recognize

190. Richard A. Millstein and Alan I. Leshner, The Science of Addiction: Research and Public
Health Perspectives, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 151, 152, 165 (1999).
191. Id. at 156 (stating that “[w]e no longer need to use inexact metaphors of eggs in a frying
pan. A study at the Massachusetts General Hospital utilizing functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging (MRI) brain scans provides a modern day depiction of your brain on drugs. MRI permits
you literally to look into the brain of a living . . . human being while that individual is experiencing
cocaine and to see the ‘signature’ in the brain of the drug experience as compared to that of the
same individual given an infusion of saline . . . . The nucleus accumbens, an area at the base of the
brain that is very important in drug abuse, not only because it is in an area that is activated during
any pleasurable experience, but also because every drug of abuse has an effect on it, showed
increased activity.”).
192. Id. at 158-60.
193. Id. at 152, 165 (stating that “[p]ervasive misconception about the nature of drug abuse and
addiction have created barriers to its adequate treatment coverage under most health care systems.
If we are going to make any real progress in this country we need to overcome that disconnect
between the scientific facts and the ideology, intuition, and so-called common sense-based
approaches to dealing with this problem. Now that we have the science base, we can in fact mount
a much more rational approach, and science can replace ideology as the foundation for drug abuse
and addiction prevention, treatment, and policy strategies.”).
194. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 178, at 694, 701-02, 704 (stating that “[t]hough it is popular,
the concept that addicts lose the ability to regulate drug consumption is false — they can and, when
properly motivated, often do . . . . All of the evidence advanced in favor of the idea that addicts lose
control describes factors that predict addiction or physical changes that result from drug use. What
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recent neuroimaging studies finding brain changes as a result of drug
use,195 they argue that any changes in the brain that result from drug use
did not cause the individual to use drugs in the first place or, even more
controversially, do not cause the individual to continue using drugs.
Opponents thus argue that disability law should not protect rehabilitated
addicts: “Congress should amend the ADA to remove the Act’s
protection of past addicts—they had and made their choices; employers
deserve the same opportunity.”196
I anticipate that scholars and other stakeholders will continue to
debate the value of neuroscience to the question of which physical and
mental impairments should constitute protected disabilities.
Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of Millstein- and Leshner-type
arguments, it is unlikely that just any condition or symptom associated
with a neuroanatomical change or correlated with local BOLD-signal
activity will result in protected disability status. First, the ADA requires
claimed physical and mental impairments to substantially limit at least
one major life activity,197 and the courts have found that many claimants
with traditional mental disorders were not protected because of evidence
showing that the claimant was still able to work, attend school, and
engage in other major life activities.198 Plaintiffs thus may attempt to
use neuroscience to provide evidence of a physical or mental
impairment, but neuroscience cannot provide evidence of the existence
or significance of any work or other social limitations. Second, the
ADA’s Interpretive Guidance expressly excludes from protection certain
physical characteristics such as “left-handedness . . . that are within
‘normal’ range and are not the result of a physiological disorder”;
“physical, psychological, environmental, cultural and economic
characteristics”; and “characteristic predisposition to illness or

is missing is evidence that these factors or physical changes cause, rather than merely result from,
the behavior that we call the disease of addiction. Brain chemistry, genetics, and psychological and
environmental factors do not cause the addict to consistently perform complex activities against his
will . . . . It is true that drugs change the internal chemistry of the brain. It does not follow from
that observation that the addict is therefore forced to take drugs.”).
195. Id. at 704 (stating that “[i]t is true that drugs change the internal chemistry of the brain.”).
196. Id. at 720.
197. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2007) (stating that “the term disability means, with respect to an
individual, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual . . . .”).
198. See, e.g., Olson v. Gen. Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 952-53 (3rd Cir. 1996) (stating
that neither multiple personality disorder nor a sleep disorder constitutes a disability without proof
that the disorder also substantially limits a major life activity).
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disease,”199 and some plaintiffs’ claims may fall within these express
exclusions.
V. THE DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND OTHER BENEFITS
The hypothetical I gave in the previous section involved the
application of the ADA’s anti-discrimination and reasonable
accommodation provisions to individuals who have a record of drug use,
but litigants already are using advances in neuroscience, especially
neuroimaging, to impact disputes about the receipt of benefits under
public and private disability, social security, and welfare programs.
To prevent healthy plaintiffs from receiving benefits when they do
not have a disability, disability plans and programs tend to define
disability in terms of an abnormality that is “demonstrable by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”200 Medical
evidence is the cornerstone of disability determinations.201 Social
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), for example, is only available to
claimants who can furnish medical and other evidence of the existence
of a disability, including “medical signs and findings, established by
medially acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques.”202
Because the Social Security Administration (SSA) will not consider
claimants’ subjective pain or other claims as conclusive evidence of
disability203 but will consider more objective evidence204 such as

199. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (Appendix to § 1630--Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Background).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3) (2007); see also, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (defining disability
for purposes of Social Security Disability Insurance as an “inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months . . . .”).
201. See, e.g., Social Security Administration, Disability Evaluation under Social Security,
BLUE BOOK, at Part II, Evidentiary Requirements (June 2006; amended April 2007), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/evidentiary.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2008)
(providing that “[u]nder both the Title II and Title XVI programs, medical evidence is the
cornerstone for the determination of disability.”).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (2007).
203. Id. § 423(d)(5)(A) (2007) (providing that “[a]n individual’s statement as to pain or other
symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability as defined in this section.”).
204. Id. (providing that “there must be medical signs and findings, established by medically
acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, which show the existence of a medical
impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which could
reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which, when considered
with all evidence required to be furnished under this paragraph (including statements of the
individual or his physician as to the intensity and persistence of such pain or other symptoms which
may reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and findings), would lead to a
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“abnormal magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) brain scan[s],”205 I
anticipate that more plaintiffs will attempt to offer neuroimaging
“evidence” of their disabilities, especially in light of cases denying
disability benefits when neuroimaging or other objective evidence was
not offered.
In a 2003 case, for example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed a district court’s decision to affirm the Social Security
Commissioner’s denial of the plaintiff’s claim for SSDI benefits based
on her cervical strain, L5 radiculopathy, dysthymic disorder, reading
disorder, somatization disorder, borderline intellectual functioning,
fibromyalgia, associated pain, and chronic fatigue syndrome.206 In
reviewing the administrative law judge’s assessment of the plaintiff’s
subjective complaints relating to her fibromyalgia, pain, and chronic
fatigue, the Sixth Circuit quoted the SSA’s statutory standard for
assessing pain and fatigue, which requires objective clinical or
laboratory manifestations versus subjective first-person complaints.207
Given that no available laboratory tests confirm diagnoses such as
chronic fatigue syndrome, the SSA stated below that it would allow
findings from an “abnormal magnetic resonance imaging MRI brain
scan.”208 The Sixth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s
conclusion that the claimant did not provide sufficient evidence of her
disability status because she did not submit sufficient objective evidence
of her pain.209
The issue of whether alcohol and drug dependence can constitute
compensable disabilities under the Social Security Act has been hotly
debated for decades. “Early decisions under the Social Security Act
demonstrated reluctance to award benefits to an alcoholic.”210 In 1975,
however, the Ninth Circuit held in Griffis v. Weinberger that chronic

conclusion that the individual is under a disability.”).
205. Bartyzel v. Commissioner, 74 Fed. Appx. 515, 527 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that “the
following findings will be sufficient, although not required, to establish a medically determinable
impairment under the Act . . . . An abnormal magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) brain scan . . . .”).
206. Id. at 518-19.
207. Id. at 525 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (2008) (stating that “there must be medical
signs and findings, established by medically acceptable or clinical or laboratory diagnostic
techniques, which show the existence of a medical impairment that results from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which could reasonably be expected to produce the
pain.”)); id. at 527 (stating that “evidence of an impairment must include objective clinical or
laboratory manifestations.”).
208. Id. at 527.
209. Id. at 528-29.
210. McShea v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 117, 118 (3rd Cir. 1983) (citing Mays v. Ribicoff, 206 F.
Supp. 170, 171 (S.D. W.Va. 1962)).
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alcoholism can, standing alone, constitute a disability: “The proposition
that chronic acute alcoholism is itself a disease, ‘a medically
determinable physical or mental impairment,’ is hardly debatable
today.”211 In 1981, the Fifth Circuit clarified that alcoholism, alone or
with other causes, can constitute a compensable disability as long as “it
prevents a claimant from engaging in substantial gainful activity.”212
More recent case law involving drug dependence has emphasized the
need for objective evidence of addiction: “A claimant must show a
behavioral or physical change associated with the regular use of
substances affecting the central nervous system.”213 In 1990, the Third
Circuit clarified that the claimant must show that she is addicted to a
substance, has lost the ability to control the abuse, and that “the
addiction renders the claimant unable to perform any gainful activity.”214
As discussed in more detail in Appendix A to this Article, scientists have
conducted dozens of neuroimaging studies in populations that use and
abuse alcohol and illegal drugs.
Some of these studies find
neurochemical and functional changes in the brains of individuals with
drug and alcohol dependence.215 Based on courts’ liberal use of the
alcoholism-and-drug-dependence-are-diseases rationale to uphold
disability determinations,216 I would anticipate that future plaintiffs may
reference more specific neuroimaging findings in the context of alcohol
and drug use and abuse, especially because neuroimaging evidence
already has worked itself into private disability benefit claims involving
other conditions.
In 2005, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the NFL Players
Retirement Plan and the NFL Players Supplemental Disability Plan
(Plans) in a lawsuit filed by former Minnesota Viking Brent Boyd for
disability benefits.217 Boyd claimed that he suffered organic brain
problems after he was knocked unconscious in a preseason football

211. Griffis v. Weinberger, 509 F.2d 837, 838 (9th Cir. 1975).
212. Ferguson v. Schweiker, 641 F.2d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 1981).
213. Matullo v. Bowen, 926 F.2d 240, 245 (3rd Cir. 1990).
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Nora D. Volkow et al., The Addicted Human Brain: Insights from Imaging
Studies, 111(10) J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 1444, 1444 (May 2003) (stating that “[i]maging
studies have revealed neurochemical and functional changes in the brains of drug-addicted subjects
that provide new insights into the mechanisms underlying addiction.”).
216. Griffis, 509 F.2d at 837 (stating that “[t]he proposition that chronic acute alcoholism is
itself a disease, ‘a medically determinable physical or mental impairment,’ is hardly debatable
today.”).
217. Boyd v. Bell, 410 F.3d 1173, 1174 (9th Cir. 2005).
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game in August 1980, and that his “constant flu-like feeling, fatigue,
headaches, queasiness, forgetfulness, intermittent blurred vision,
difficulty reading, lack of concentration, learning difficulty, memory
loss, dizziness and light-headedness” qualified him for total and
permanent disability benefits under the Plans.218 As part of the lawsuit,
Boyd was subjected to nearly two days of neuropsychological testing.219
Some of the physicians agreed with Boyd that his single photon
emission computed tomography (SPECT) scan showed “decreased brain
activity ‘consistent with head trauma’”220 and that he was disabled due to
his August 1980 brain injury.221 Other physicians agreed with the Plans
that Boyd’s depression, untreated hypertension and physical
deconditioning, and not the alleged August 1980 head injury, caused his
symptoms.222 In the end, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Plans.223
Based on the Boyd case and a number of other disability cases in
which structural and functional brain scans have been ordered, used, or
requested,224 I anticipate with trepidation the extent to which plaintiffs
will attempt to introduce both structural and functional neuroimaging
evidence in support of traditional and novel225 disabilities, especially
218. Id. at 1175.
219. Id. at 1177.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1179.
224. See, e.g., Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing
an instance in which a physician recommended a brain scan to clarify the disability insurance
claimant’s diagnosis of possible metabolic disturbance, early Alzheimer’s disease, episode of
ischemia, or embolus to the brain).
225. The health, disability, and welfare case law is filled with claims by plaintiffs for benefits
based on a range of novel conditions and behaviors, such as phobia of driving in unfamiliar
locations, known propensity to engage in risky behavior, ability to become angered easily,
sensitivity to fragrances, cat and dog allergies, other allergies and chemical sensitivities, fear of
cancer, grief, conversion disorder, albinism, eosinophilia, generalized stress, and so on. See, e.g.,
Kaufmann v. GMAC Mortgage, 229 Fed. Appx. 164, 165 (3rd Cir. 2007) (claiming disability of
fragrance sensitivity); Sinkler v. Midwest Prop. Mgmt., 209 F.3d 678, 687 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding
the phobia of driving anywhere unfamiliar did not substantially limit plaintiff’s ability to work and
therefore is not a disability); Christian v. St. Anthony Med. Center, 117 F.3d 1051, 1051 (7th Cir.
1997) (considering the plainiff’s claim of disability based on high cholesterol level); Bukta v. J.C.
Penney Co., Inc., 359 F. Supp.2d 649, 655 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (considering the plaintiff’s claim that
conversion disorder was disability); Baker v. Greyhound Bus Line, 240 F. Supp.2d 454, 455 (D.
Md. 2003) (holding that albinism not disability); Gallagher v. Sunrise Assisted Living of Haverford,
268 F. Supp.2d 436, 443 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (holding that the plaintiff’s allergy to cats and dogs not a
disability); Fenton v. Pritchard Corp. 926 F. Supp. 1437, 1443, 1446 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that
the plaintiff’s propensity to “go postal” or “go ballistic” not a disability); Shah v. Upjohn Co., 922
F. Supp. 15, 40-41 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff’s allergy to job and fear of cancer
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since many public and private disability plans define a disability in terms
of whether there exists a “physiological disorder or conditions” or
personality trait that is a symptom of a mental or psychological
disorder.226
How might we assess these claims? Many of the limitations
mentioned in the previous sections will apply, but note that the SSA
requires disability claimants to be unable to engage in any substantial
gainful activity for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.227 Courts have found many claimants with traditional mental
disorders not protected because they were able to engage in some type of
gainful work activity. The burden of establishing disability is on the
claimant, and substantial evidence of disability is required.228 Plaintiffs
thus may offer neuroimaging evidence, but neuroscience cannot provide
evidence of the existence or significance of any work or other social
limitation.229
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have shown that stakeholders already are relying
on advances in the behavioral and brain sciences to characterize
traditionally suspect mental health conditions as brain-based conditions
worthy of insurance coverage, statutory parity, protected disability
status, and disability benefits. By and large, the plaintiffs in the cases I
reviewed were not making completely unfounded or speculative claims
about neuroscience. Most of the plaintiffs (or their experts) were
making general although supported references to scientific research

do not constitute disabilities); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102, Notes of Decisions, 44-149 (2005) (providing
annotated list of hundreds of cases in which plaintiffs claim traditional and novel disabilities).
226. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (Appendix to Part 1630--Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act Background).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(2) (2007) (providing that “[a]n individual
shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate
area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be
hired if he applied for work. For purposes of the preceding sentence (with respect to any
individual), ‘work which exists in the national economy’ means work which exists in significant
numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.”).
228. Carter v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1981).
229. Id. at 940-41 (stating that “[t]he record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s
determination that Carter’s seizures were not disabling. None of the physicians who treated or
examined Carter indicated that her seizures so severely restricted her ability to engage in
‘substantial gainful activity’ as to be disabling.”).
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showing that the brains of individuals who have a range of mental
disorders may be neuroanatomically, neurocognitively, and/or
neurochemically “different” when compared to the brains of healthy
controls. Although a careful review of the underlying studies does
reveal many discrepancies and contradictions, the plaintiffs in the cases I
discussed were alluding to general trends that are based in the scientific
literature. One of the defendant’s arguments—the argument of the
insurance company in Fitts v. Unum Life Insurance Company that the
insured did not have bipolar disorder because no brain scans showed any
changes in the plaintiff’s brain—did concern me.230 The argument (and
its alternative argument—that brain scans cannot yet detect bipolar
disorder) concerns me because it shows the extent to which litigants are
willing to throw into the ring just any neuroscience-based claim in the
hope that something will stick with the judge or the jury. One of the
reasons I am excited about the emerging neuroethics and neurolaw
literature is that I hope judges will read the many careful philosophical,
evidentiary, and other analyses and issue opinions that are more
reasoned as a result.
What gives me real cause for pause, though, is the appropriateness
of many of the stakeholders’ subsequent normative or substantive
arguments; that is, that all mental disorders should be treated as covered
or protected conditions for purposes of health, disability, and benefit
law. I do think that neuroscience gives stakeholders one additional
source of ammunition, perhaps some will refer to it as evidence, in
support of the normative argument that mental disorders should be
treated more like physical illnesses for purposes of health, disability, and
benefit law. I also think that advances in neuroscience do give us reason
to revisit age-old health, disability, and benefit law questions, such as
“[w]hich kinds of mental suffering create a legitimate claim for
assistance from others through [public or private] health insurance?”231
But neuroscience does not yet and probably never will answer a range of
questions that are more important to the future of health law and policy.
For example, neuroscience does not tell us how we should allocate finite
health care dollars among all of the different physical and mental
disorders, including the expanding category of biologically-based mental
disorders. Even with advances in neuroscience, we are still left to weigh
the value of knowing that many mental disorders may have a biological
component against the cost of providing equal insurance benefits, the

230. Fitts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33397, at *25.
231. Sabin & Daniels, supra note 18, at 5.
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cost of expanding the scope of protected status under disability law, and
the cost of distributing additional benefits under other legal schemes.
Neuroscience also does not give us a better definition of “medical
necessity,” which is the key to reimbursement under most public and
private health insurance programs and plans. Neuroscience does not, for
example, tell us when a structural or functional difference becomes
significant enough such that its treatment should be reimbursed by the
Medicare and Medicaid Programs or a private health insurance plan.
Neuroscience also does not tell us whether we should take a “hard-line”
or “expansive” view of medical necessity.232 For example, should our
health insurers only reimburse treatments for impairments that
significantly interfere with an individual’s ability to live and function?
Or, should our health insurers reimburse treatments that would enhance
healthy individuals’ current level of functioning? Should we adopt a
“normal function model” of health care (in which the target of clinical
action is a medically-defined deviation and the goal of health care is to
decrease the impact of disease or disability), a “capability model” (in
which the target of clinical action is an unchosen constraint of personal
capability and the goal of health care is to enhance personal capability)
or a “welfare model” (in which the target of clinical action is an
unchosen constraint of potential for happiness and the goal of health care
is to enhance potential for happiness)?233 Neuroscience, as we all know,
raises many new questions about the differences between treatment and
enhancement.234 Even with neuroscience, then, health policymakers will
continue to struggle with how best to identify health care’s goals, define
medically necessary care, and determine how much medically necessary
care public and private programs should provide.235
The extent to which health law ultimately consults neuroscience to
achieve its goals remains to be seen. In the meantime, I urge
policymakers not to completely defer to neuroscience due to, among
other things, differences between the disciplines’ orientations and
professional vocabularies. Note in this Article how frequently statutory,
regulatory, and contractual authorities differentiate between physical and
232. Id.; see also Glazer, supra note 106, at 362.
233. See Sabin & Daniels, supra note 18, at 10-11 (offering three approaches to health care).
234. See, e.g., Robert Klitzman, Clinicians, Patients, and the Brain, in NEUROETHICS:
DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 229, 236 (Judy Illes ed., 2006) (stating
“[w]hat if clinicians can improve upon a person’s baseline level of cognitive functioning? Should
clinicians be limited in doing so in any way?”); Erik Parens, How Far Will the
Treatment/Enhancement Distinction Get Us as We Grapple with New Ways to Shape Our Selves? in
NEUROETHICS: MAPPING THE FIELD 152, 153-54 (Steven J. Marcus ed., 2002) (stating the same).
235. See Sabin & Daniels, supra note 18, at 12.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss2/5

40

Tovino: Neuroscience and Health Law

10-TOVINO_PUB_EDITS.DOC

2009]

4/14/2009 1:20 PM

NEUROSCIENCE AND HEALTH LAW

509

mental illnesses. Even though health law contains dozens of such
differential definitions (with the result that less legal protection and
fewer benefits flow to individuals who have a condition that falls within
the legal definition of a psychiatric illness or mental disorder), the
behavioral and brain sciences are not that rigid. In its Introduction to the
DSM-IV, the American Psychiatric Association admits that the concept
of mental disorder, like so many other concepts in medicine and science,
lacks a consistent operational definition that works in all situations.236
For example, medical conditions may be based on various levels of
abstraction, such as “structural pathology (e.g., ulcerative colitis),
symptom presentation (e.g., migraine), deviance from a physiological
norm (e.g., hypertension), and etiology (e.g., pneumococcal
pneumonia).”237 Mental disorders also may be defined in terms of a
number of different concepts, such as “distress, dysfunction, dyscontrol,
disadvantage, disability, inflexibility, irrationality, syndromal pattern,
etiology, and statistical deviation.”238 Although each is a useful
indicator for a mental disorder, none is equivalent to the concept of
mental disorder.239 In the end, the American Psychiatric Association
decided to use the term mental disorder in the DSM-IV only because it
“is as useful as any other” and “has helped to guide decisions regarding
which conditions on the boundary between normality and pathology
should be included.”240
Medicine and science recognize the blending of the physical and
the mental, but health law is only starting down that road. Because I
anticipate that neuroscience will continue to play a role in the
development and shaping of health law, I recommend that traditional
health lawyers and scholars (and not just the few who self-identify as
neuroethicists or neurolawyers) be mindful of the ways in which
stakeholders will use neuroscience to bear on the formulation and
interpretation of the law.241
_____________________

236. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 84, at xxx.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at xxx-xxxi.
240. Id. at xxxi.
241. See Wexler, supra note 19, at 10 (encouraging stakeholders to consider ways in which the
clinical literature might bear on the formulation of legal arrangements).
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APPENDIX A
Many patients, patient advocacy organizations, litigants, lobbyists,
legislators, and scholars believe that the stigma against mental disorders
plays a role in their lack of funding for research, their lack of parity in
public and private health insurance coverage, and their lack of available
and reimbursable treatments.242 Four sets of mental disorders, including
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, alcohol and drug dependence, and
anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa, are frequently used to illustrate
these claims. This Appendix briefly examines these conditions and
summarizes their neuroscientific investigation.
1. Schizophrenia
The NIMH defines schizophrenia as “a chronic, severe, and
disabling brain disorder” that affects approximately 1.1% of American
adults (or 2.4 million) in a given year.243 Symptoms of schizophrenia
include “hallucinations, delusions, disordered thinking, movement

242. See, e.g., Pamela Signorello, The Failure of the ADA-Achieving Parity with Respect to
Mental and Physical Health Care Coverage in the Private Employment Realm, 10 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 349, 368 (2001) (stating that “[s]ome diseases are more politically ‘in’ than others. We
all know the more political backing there is, the more attention, the more funds, and the more
patient-protection legislation. My guess is that if AIDS rates a 10, then breast cancer is a 7, prostate
cancer is a 6 . . . . Yes, you guessed it. I am unable to assign a number to the mental health
category. If I have to judge by the coverage in the popular press, this category is close to the bottom
of the food chain.”); id. at 368, 371 (stating that “[c]ontrary to lingering public perception, mental
illnesses are not indicative of personal weakness, lack of character, or poor upbringing . . . . One
thing is certain. The stigma associated with mental illness has supported the disparity in health care
coverage.”); Nicole Martinson, Inequality between Disabilities: The Different Treatment of Mental
Versus Physical Disabilities in Long-Term Disability Benefit Plans, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 361, 361
(1998) (stating that “[t]he stigma of mental illness has kept many in need from seeking help, and it
has prevented policymakers from providing it.”); Brian D. Shannon, Paving the Path to Parity in
Health Insurance Coverage for Mental Illness: New Law or Merely Good Intentions?, 68 U. COLO.
L. REV. 63, 85 (1997) (citing 142 Cong. Rec. S3590 (daily ed. Apr.18, 1996) (statement of Senator
Wellstone)) (stating that “[t]he stigma of mental illness has kept many in need from seeking help,
and it has prevented policymakers from providing it. And for too long, persons in need of mental
health services who reach private coverage discriminatory limits have been dumped onto
Government-funded programs.”).
243. National
Institute
of
Mental
Health,
What
Is
Schizophrenia?,
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/schizophrenia/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2008);
National Institute of Mental Health, The Numbers Count: Mental Disorders in America,
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/the-numbers-count-mental-disorders-in-america.shtml
(last visited Jan. 31, 2008); see also Philip McGuire et al., Functional Neuroimaging in
Schizophrenia: Diagnosis and Drug Discovery, 29(2) TRENDS IN PHARMACOLOGICAL SCI. 91, 91
(2008).
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disorders, flat affect, social withdrawal, and cognitive deficits.”244
Individuals who have schizophrenia may hear voices that other
individuals do not hear or may believe that others are plotting to harm
These experiences can make individuals who have
them.245
schizophrenia fearful and withdrawn and cause difficulties when these
individuals try to have relationships with others.246 Although scientists
have not yet uncovered the cause or causes of schizophrenia, current
treatments, including antipsychotic drugs, can minimize the symptoms
of schizophrenia and help affected individuals live independent and
fulfilling lives.247
Elsewhere, I examined the scientific248 and social249 history of a
variety of body and brain imaging technologies and the reasons for their
use by investigators with varying backgrounds and interests, including
psychiatry. I suggested that scientists began using neuroimaging to
investigate psychiatric conditions when explanations for these conditions
were in transition, “as if this might settle once and for all whether
illnesses such as schizophrenia are really brain diseases.”250 To this end,
dozens of studies have used structural and functional neuroimaging in an
attempt to better understand schizophrenia251 and to develop new drugs
that will better treat it.252
These studies have resulted in many discrepancies and
contradictions,253 although some trends have emerged.254 A number of
structural neuroimaging studies find that individuals who have

244. National Institute of Mental Health, What Is Schizophrenia?, http://www.nimh.nih.gov
/health/topics/schizophrenia/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Tovino, The Visible Brain, supra note 14, at Chapters 1 and 2.
249. Stacey A. Tovino, Imaging Body Structure and Mapping Brain Function: A Historical
Approach, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 193, 193-95 (2007).
250. Robert B. Zipursky, Imaging Mental Disorders in the 21st Century, 52 CANADIAN J.
PSYCHIATRY 133, 133 (2007).
251. Karen
Faith
Berman,
Functional
Neuroimaging
in
Schizophrenia,
in
NEUROSPYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: THE FIFTH GENERATION OF PROGRESS 745, 748 (Kenneth L.
Davis et al. eds., 2002) (summarizing dozens of studies involving frontal lobe findings with
activation paradigms in schizophrenia since 1985).
252. McGuire et al., supra note 31, at 94-95.
253. See, e.g., Russell T. Loeber et al., Differences in Cerebellar Blood Volume in
Schizophrenia and Bipolar disorder, 37 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 81, 81 (1999) (stating that “[b]rain
morphometry has been studied extensively in schizophrenic patients, and among the cortical
differences identified two consistent findings are decreased cerebellar vermal volume and increased
volume of the fourth ventricle; although contradictory findings are reported as well.”).
254. Berman, supra note 251, at 747.
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schizophrenia have whole-brain gray matter volume deficits255 and
enlarged ventricles.256 Volume reductions have been found to be most
notable in the frontotemporal regions, medial temporal lobe structures,
and sometimes the prefrontal cortex and other parts of the temporal lobe,
including the superior temporal gyrus.257 Some neuroimaging studies
find that “brain abnormalities associated with schizophrenia progress as
the disorder develops.”258 Some neuroimaging studies show that
individuals with schizophrenia have abnormal prefrontal activity during
tests involving working memory and, during other tasks, deficits in
cingulated cortex as well as alterations in frontal-temporal and other
Some neuroimaging
intracortical functional relationship.259
abnormalities are evident before the onset of the disorder, which may
suggest that neuroimaging could be used to detect pathophysiological
changes associated with the disorder before the onset of frank illness.260
Many neuroimaging studies have been devoted to studying the effects of
antipsychotic drugs (especially Clozapine) on the brains of individuals
with schizophrenia, with some findings relating to the primary site of
therapeutic action and optimal dosages of antipsychotics.261 It is not
unusual for a study or review article to conclude that chronic
schizophrenia is associated with “extensive neuroanatomical,
neurocognitive and neurochemical abnormalities,”262 but also to
emphasize the challenges presented by the diagnosis and treatment of
schizophrenia.263
Many neuroimaging studies have been heavily criticized for failing
to take into account the confounding effects of antipsychotic and other
medication regimens, illicit drug use, cigarette smoking, endocrine
changes, activity level, and diet.264 Notwithstanding, many scientists

255. See, e.g., Robert B. Zipursky et al., Widespread Cerebral Gray Matter Volume Deficits in
Schizophrenia, 49(3) ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 195 (1992); Raquel E. Gur et al.,
Deconstructing Psychosis with Human Brain Imaging, 33(4) SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 921, 922
(2007).
256. See, e.g., Zipursky, supra note 250, at 133; Loeber et al., supra note 253, at 81.
257. See, e.g., Gur et al., supra note 255, at 922.
258. See, e.g., McGuire et al., supra note 243, at 96.
259. Berman, supra note 251, at 747.
260. McGuire et al., supra note 243, at 92 (stating that “[t]he ability of neuroimaging to detect
pathophysiological changes in advance of clinical symptoms points to its potential as an aid to
diagnosis.”).
261. Id. at 95.
262. Id. at 96
263. Id.
264. See, e.g., Birgit Abler et al., Abnormal Reward System Activation in Mania,
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 2217, 2226 (2007); Zipursky, supra note 250, at 133.
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now believe that schizophrenia is “associated with measurable, objective
signs of altered brain function.”265 Although some scientists are
pessimistic about treatment outcomes due to the reported structural and
functional differences found between the brains of individuals with
schizophrenia and healthy controls,266 others are confident that future
neuroimaging studies will lead to information that has “the potential to
lead to direct intervention.”267
2. Bipolar Disorder
Approximately 2.6% of American adults (or 5.7 million) suffer
from bipolar disorder in a given year.268 The NIMH defines bipolar
disorder, also known as manic-depressive disorder, as a serious mental
disorder “that causes shifts in a person’s mood, energy, and ability to
function.”269 Bipolar disorder can cause dramatic mood swings from
overly “high” and/or irritable (mania) to sad and hopeless (depression),
and then back again, often with periods of normal mood in between.270
Although scientists have not yet uncovered the cause of bipolar disorder,
they have developed drugs that, combined with psychosocial treatment,
do help many individuals with bipolar disorder stabilize their mood
swings and related symptoms over time.271
Like schizophrenia, bipolar disorder has been the focus of many
structural and functional neuroimaging studies. Although whole brain
volumes of patients with mood disorders, including bipolar disorder,
may not differ from those of healthy controls, some structural
neuroimaging studies show that regional deficits may exist in the frontal
lobe, particularly in the anterior cingulate and the orbitofrontal cortex.272
Some functional neuroimaging studies also have found the neural
265. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 251, at 745. Fuller Torrey, one of America’s most famous
psychiatrists, has stated that, the “evidence is now overwhelming that the brains of persons who
have schizophrenia are, as a group, different from brains of persons who do not have the disease.”
See Richard E. Gardner, Mind Over Matter? The Historical Search for Meaningful Parity Between
Mental and Physical Health Care Coverage, 49 EMORY L.J. 675, 683 (2000).
266. See, e.g., Zipursky, supra note 250, at 133.
267. Berman, supra note 251, at 754.
268. National Institute of Mental Health, Mental Disorders in America,
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/the-numbers-count-mental-disorders-in-america.shtml
(last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
269. National
Institute
of
Mental
Health,
What
Is
Bipolar
Disorder?
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/bipolar-disorder/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Jakub Z. Zonarski et al., Volumetric Neuroimaging Investigations in Mood Disorders:
Bipolar Disorder Versus Major Depressive Disorder, 10 BIPOLAR DISORDERS 1, 3-4 (2008).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009

45

Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 5

10-TOVINO_PUB_EDITS.DOC

514

4/14/2009 1:20 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[42:469

correlates of altered reward processing or dysfunctional reward
pathways (including elevated activation of dopaminergic brain areas
when expecting high rewards compared to anticipation of no rewards
and decreased ventral striatum activation when an expected reward was
omitted) in individuals who have bipolar disorder.273 Some pediatric
functional neuroimaging studies have found that bipolar disorder is
“associated with abnormalities in a circuit thought to be involved in
mood regulation that encompasses the amygdala, striatum and ventral
PFC.”274 Like the schizophrenia studies, the bipolar studies have many
limitations. It is not uncommon for a bipolar study or review article to
conclude, for example, that future studies must strive to more
definitively establish the effect on findings of age, medication, and other
variables.275
3. Alcohol and Drug Dependence
An estimated fourteen to fifteen million Americans meet diagnostic
criteria for alcohol use disorders and more than eighteen percent of
Americans experience alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence at some time
in their lives.276 An estimated sixteen million Americans use illicit
drugs.277 A huge literature is devoted to documenting the results of
structural and functional studies of the brains of individuals who use and
abuse, depend on and withdraw from, and are abstinent from and crave
alcohol and illicit drugs.278 For example, many structural neuroimaging

273. Abler et al., supra note 264, at 2222, 2224, 2226.
274. Jane Avery Serene et al., Neuroimaging Studies of Children with Serious Emotional
Disturbances: A Selective Review, 52(3) CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 135, 135 (2007).
275. Zonarski et al., supra note 272, at 1.
276. Greater
Dallas
Council
on
Alcohol
&
Drug
Abuse,
Alcohol,
http://www.gdcada.org/statistics/alcohol.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
277. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., NATIONWIDE SURVEY SHOWS
MOST ILLICIT DRUG USERS AND HEAVY ALCOHOL USERS ARE IN THE WORKPLACE AND MAY POSE
SPECIAL PROBLEMS, http://www.samhsa.gov/newsroom/advisories/070713survey0610.aspx (last
visited Feb. 8, 2008).
278. See, e.g., Yoshihide Akine et al., Altered Brain Activation by a False Recognition Task in
Young Abstinent Patients with Alcohol Dependence, 31(9) ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL &
EXPERIMENTAL RES. 1589 (2007); Joanna S. Fowler et al., Imaging the Addicted Human Brain, SCI.
& PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES 4 (2007); Andreas J. Bartsch et al., Manifestations of Early Brain
Recovery Associated with Abstinence from Alcoholism, 130 BRAIN 36 (2007); Rita Z. Goldstein et
al., Role of the Anterior Cingulate and Medial Orbitofrontal Cortex in Processing Drug Cues in
Cocaine Addiction, 144(4) NEUROSCIENCE 1153 (2007); Sandra Chanraud et al., Brain
Morphometry and Cognitive Performance in Detoxified Alcohol-Dependents with Preserved
Psychosocial Functioning, 32 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 429 (2007); Dardo Tomasi et al.,
Thalamo-Cortical Dysfunction in Cocaine Abusers: Implications in Attention and Perception, 155
PSYCHIATRY RES.: NEUROIMAGING 189 (2007); G. Dom et al., Substance Use Disorders and the
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studies find “brain shrinkage” with chronic alcoholism.279 Some
structural neuroimaging studies find an increase in hippocampal,
cerebral, and cerebellar volume after abstinence from alcohol.280 Some
studies find that changes in brain volume during short-term abstinence in
chronic alcohol-dependent patients are confined to the white matter.281
Some neurochemical studies have shown that
large and fast increases in dopamine are associated with the reinforcing
effects of drugs of abuse, but also that after chronic drug abuse and
during withdrawal, brain dopamine function is markedly decreased and
these decreases are associated with dysfunction of prefrontal
282
regions.

Some functional neuroimaging studies find that “cocaine cues lead
to abnormally high cingulate and low frontal lobe activation in cocaine
addicts.”283 Many neuroimaging studies and review articles conclude
that individuals who are addicted to alcohol and drugs have
neurochemical and functional brain changes.284 Many neuroimaging

Orbitofrontal Cortex, 187 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 209 (2005); Peter S. Kufahl et al., Neural
Responses to Acute Cocaine Administration in the Human Brain Detected by fMRI, 28
NEUROIMAGE 904 (2005); Nikos Makris et al., Decreased Absolute Amygdala Volume in Cocaine
Addicts, 44 NEURON 729 (2004); D.J. Meyerhoff et al., Effects of Heavy Drinking, Binge Drinking,
and Family History of Alcoholism on Regional Brain Metabolites, 28(4) ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL &
EXPERIMENTAL RES. 650 (2004); Clinton D. Kilts et al., The Neural Correlates of Cue-Induced
Craving in Cocaine-Dependent Women, 161(2) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 233 (2004); Andreas Heinz et
al., Correlation between Dopamine D2 Receptors in the Ventral Striatum and Central Processing of
Alcohol Cues and Craving, 161(10) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1783 (2004); Nora D. Volkow et al., The
Addicted Human Brain Viewed in the Light of Imaging Studies: Brain Circuits and Treatment
Strategies, 47 NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 3 (2004); Nora D. Volkow et al., The Addicted Human
Brain: Insights from Imaging Studies, 111(10) J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 1444 (2003); A.R.
Lingford-Hughes et al., Addiction, 65 BRIT. MED. BULL. 209 (2003); Ingrid Agartz et al., MR
Volumetry during Acute Alcohol Withdrawal and Abstinence: A Descriptive Study, 38(1) ALCOHOL
& ALCOHOLISM 71 (2003); Rita Z. Goldstein et al., Drug Addiction and Its Underlying
Neurobiological Basis: Neuroimaging Evidence for the Involvement of the Frontal Cortex, 159(10)
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1642 (2002); Stephen J. Uftring et al., An fMRI Study of the Effect of
Amphetamine on Brain Activity, 25(6) NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 925 (2001); Bruce E.
Wexler et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Cocaine Craving, 158(1) AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 86 (2001); R.S.N. Liu et al., Association between Brain Size and Abstinence from
Alcohol, 355 (9219) LANCET 1969 (2000); Daniel W. Hommer, Functional Imaging of Craving,
ALCOHOL RES. & HEALTH (Fall 1999).
279. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 278, at 1969.
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., Agartz, supra note 278, at 76.
282. See, e.g., Volkow et al., supra note 278, at 1444.
283. See, e.g., Wexler et al., supra note 278, at 86.
284. See, e.g., Volkow et al., supra note 282, at 1444.
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studies propose models that attempt to explain the loss of control and
compulsive alcohol and drug intake that characterize addiction.285
4. Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia Nervosa
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) defines anorexia nervosa as
“an eating disorder marked by an intense fear of gaining weight, a
refusal to maintain a healthy weight, and a distorted body image.”286
Bulimia nervosa is characterized by recurrent periods of binge eating, in
which large amounts of food are consumed during a short period of time,
followed by self-induced vomiting, abuse of diuretics or laxatives, or
fasting.287 An estimated three tenths to one percent of young American
women have anorexia nervosa, and an estimated one percent to three
percent of young women have bulimia nervosa.288 Although “eating
disorders are more common in women, they do occur in men.”289
Anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa have been the focus of many
structural and functional neuroimaging studies.
Some structural
neuroimaging studies have found decreased gray and white matter
volumes and increased cerebrospinal fluid volumes in individuals who
have anorexia nervosa, as well as gray matter deficits in individuals who
are weight-recovered from anorexia nervosa, which suggests that there
may be an irreversible component to the structural brain changes
associated with the illness.290 Some studies have found that the “regionspecific gray matter loss in the anterior cingulate cortex is directly
related to the severity of anorexia nervosa, indicating an important role
of this area in the pathophysiology of the disorder.”291 Other studies
have not found a cerebral tissue decrease in weight-recovered
individuals who suffered from anorexia nervosa.292 Some studies have
285. Id.
Anorexia
Nervosa,
286. Nat’l
Inst.
of
Health,
Nat’l
Cancer
Inst.,
http://www.cancer.gov/Templates/db_alpha.aspx?CdrID=426405 (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
287. Nat’l Inst. of Health et al., Bulimia Nervosa, PSYCHOL. TODAY, available at
http://psychologytoday.com/conditions/bulimia.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
288. Eating Disorders Coalition, Statistics and Study Findings, http://www.eatingdisorders
coalition.org/reports/statistics.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
289. Id.
290. Mark Mühlau et al., Gray Matter Decrease of the Anterior Cingulate Cortex in Anorexia
Nervosa, 164(12) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1850 (2007) (concluding that “[i]n anorexia nervosa, part of
the global gray matter loss persists over the long run.”); E.K. Lambe et al., Cerebral Gray Matter
Volume Deficits after Weight Recovery from Anorexia Nervosa, 54(6) ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY
537 (1997).
291. Mühlau et al., supra note 290, at 1850.
292. See, e.g., id. (stating, however, that “data regarding the reversibility of this cerebral tissue
decrease are conflicting.”).
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found that “individuals who have recovered from anorexia nervosa may
have difficulties in differentiating positive and negative feedback.”293
Some, but not all, studies using PET have found brain serotonin and
other alterations in patients who have recovered from anorexia
nervosa294 and bulimia nervosa.295 Almost all neuroimaging studies
involving individuals with anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa
conclude that further research is warranted to determine the cause,
specificity, and functional consequences of the structural and/or
functional brain changes associated with these disorders.296

293. See, e.g., Angela Wagner et al., Altered Reward Processing in Women Recovered from
Anorexia Nervosa, 164(12) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1842, 1842 (Dec. 2007) (stating that “[t]he
exaggerated activation of the caudate, a region involved in linking action to outcome, may
constitute an attempt at ‘strategic’ (as opposed to hedonic) means of responding to reward stimuli.
The authors hypothesize that individuals with anorexia nervosa have an imbalance in information
processing, with impaired ability to identify the emotional significance of a stimulus but increased
traffic in neurocircuits concerned with planning and consequences.”).
294. See, e.g., Ursula F. Bailer et al., Exaggerated 5-HT1A but Normal 5-HT2A Receptor
Activity in Individuals Ill with Anorexia Nervosa, 61(9) BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 1090, 1090 (May
1, 2007); Ursula F. Bailer et al., Altered Brain Serotonin 5-HT1A Receptor Binding after Recovery
from Anorexia Nervosa Measured by Positron Emission Tomography, 62(9) ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 1032, 1032 (2005); G.K. Frank et al., Reduced 5-HT2A Receptor Binding after
Recovery from Anorexia Nervosa, 52(9) BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 896, 896, 901 (Nov. 1, 2002).
295. See, e.g., Walter H. Kaye et al., Altered Serotonin 2A Receptor Activity in Women Who
Have Recovered from Bulimia Nervosa, 158(7) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1152, 1152 -153(2001).
296. See, e.g., Mühlau et al., supra note 290, at 1850-851.
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